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SYNOPSIS
The analysis begins by stressing the necessity to analyse 
the urban system before the role of the local state can itself 
be understood. The urban system is seen not simply as a production 
site and the importance of circulation is stressed both for the 
continued reproduction of capital and for the analysis of the urban 
system.
The distribution between the role (function) and the nature of 
the city is introduced in Chapter 1 as is the need to appreciate 
that sociological analysis must attempt to analyse the actions of 
social agents, but within a structural framework, and it is suggested 
that these structural laws can only be fully explained by a historical 
materialist analysis.
Chapter 2 discusses the application of historical materialist 
theory to concrete situations. Two different Marxist approaches are 
discussed and, although a focus on the dynamics of the consumption/ 
reproduction sphere had been the main concern of Marxist analyses of 
the state, it is suggested that both are linked. The limitations of 
orthodox economic analysis of the urban system is also demonstrated.
It is further suggested in this Chapter that there is a need to 
focus attention on the tendency and capacity of the capitalist mode of 
production to itself generate the conditions necessary for its 
continued existence. The "division of labour" among capitals is 
introduced and the role finance and property capital play in both 
stabilizing in times of crisis and otherwise securing the general
conditions necessary for capital accumulation is demonstrated. The 
particular nature of the profits of property capital is shown to 
have an effect on the shaping of urban space. Finally, the 
potential contradictions which would arise from the MUnmediated" 
dynamics of capitalist accumulation are suggested.
The functional role of the city for capital accumulation is 
demonstrated in Chapter 3 as are certain obstacles to the achievement 
of this role. Lojkine's analysis of these obstacles is used to 
demonstrate the weaknesses of those Marxist theories whose principle 
explanatory device in explaining both genesis and nature of a 
phenomenon is the labour theory of value. The distinction between 
surplus value and profit is introduced and it is suggested that it 
is both mistaken and unnecessary to attempt to explain both genesis 
and subsequent functions of a phenomenon by a single all-embracing 
theory.
This distinction is reiterated and expanded upon in Chapter 4«
It is shown that orthodox theories can be used to explain certain 
aspects of a phenomenon while at the same time requiring to be 
complemented by Marxian analysis.
A classification of state expenditure is proposed in Chapter 5 
and certain of the functions undertaken by the local state are referred 
to. It is shown that there is overlap between the services and 
facilities provided and the functions they perform. However, it is 
contended that state expenditures cannot be explained simply in terms 
of these functions and that it is necessary to analyze why the state
undertakes such functions and what are the determinants on their 
provision*
Both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 demonstrate how orthodox analysis 
cannot fully explain the last point*
The remaining part of this work is concerned with examining 
Marxist analyses of the state and the determinants on its actions* 
Certain aspects of such analysis are criticized and alternative 
approaches are tentatively proposed*
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INTRODUCTION
An important new theoretical current has appeared in the 
field of urban sociology with the application of historical 
materialism to the subject during the I960's. Following Althusser 
(l970)> French writers began to develop historical materialism as 
a science in the field of political economy and to apply it to 
the analysis of urban sociology in general, and to the study of 
the role of the state within capitalist urban systems in particular.
The aim of this thesis is to critically examine the way in 
which the role and nature of the state within capitalist urban 
systems is analysed and perceived by those authors who currently 
exert influence on Marxist discussion in this country, to assess the 
validity of their arguments and, finally, to suggest a theoretical 
framework which would overcome some of the difficulties on weaknesses 
which, as will be shown below, are inherent in many of the approaches 
thus far elaborated.
However, it would be wrong to take an analysis of the "local 
state" as our starting-point, for before the role and nature of 
the state within capitalist urban systems can itself be discussed 
two factors must be taken into consideration.
(1) one's subject matter cannot be discussed without reference 
to its environment for to do so one encounters the 
limitation that, by divorcing the subject-matter from 
its context, one is unable to fully deal with external/
systemic (and, less importantly, contingent) factors 
influencing it* Thus, it is contended here that 
the local state cannot be adequately discussed and 
analysed without reference to the urban environment 
within which it operates; and, indeed, as will be 
demonstrated below, an understanding of the nature 
of the urban system within capitalism is a necessary 
PRE-requisite for any discussion of the local state*
The local state is only one part of a wider political 
system* At the formal institutional level the degree 
of autonomy or dependence is variable both historically 
and between different nations. Nevertheless, at the 
structural level, there is integration and inter­
dependence between the elements of the whole (political) 
system and it is necessary to group the GENERAL laws 
of the system before we can analyze its particular 
elements. As Cockburn puts it
"There is no ready made theory of local 
government* It is necessary to piece 
together a number of concepts about the 
state as a whole and draw conclusions from 
them for local government*" (l977fP*41*)
CHAPTER 1: URBANIZATION: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION
"the urban question is first and foremost the 
product of the capitalist mode of production,which 
requires a spatial organisation which facilitates 
the circulation of capital, commodities, information 
etc. (Lamarche, 1976, p*86)
1.1 Introduction
Until recent years most urban histories have treated the growth 
of cities as a gradual, evolutionary and ongoing process of general 
historical development. However, in the Marxian view, that history 
must be seen in a different light. The Marxian analysis of the 
spatial division of labour suggests that no particular pattern of 
urban development is inevitably the result of some universal historical 
spatial process. Rather, spatial forms themselves are conditioned by 
the particular mode of production dominating the society under study, 
and thus it is argued that the process of capital accumulation has 
been the most important factor structuring the growth of cities within 
Western democracies.
"Analyses of the process of urbanization are situated, 
generally speaking, in an evolutionary theoretical 
perspective, according to which each social formation 
is produced, without break, by a duplication of the 
elements of the preceeding social formation. The 
forms of spatial settlement are therefore one of the /
most visible expressions of these modifications....
This evolution of spatial forms has even been used
to classify the stages of universal history....
In fact, rather than establishing the criteria of 
periodization, it is absolutely necessary to study 
the production of spatial forms on the basis of the
(1)underlying social structure." (Castells,1977*PP7*-8)
1.2 Urbanization and the reproduction of capital
For both Lojkine (1976) and Lamarche (1976) the development of 
urban agglomeration within Western democracies is determined by 
the constant tendency of capitalism to reduce both production time 
and the time it takes for capital to circulate*
Lojkine contends that Marx applied the concept of the "social­
ization" of productive forces under capitalism not only to the work­
place but also to the reproduction of social capital AS A WHOLE.
Marx's concept of the "general conditions" of production (which 
defines the relation between the immediate process of production 
and circulation of capital) forms the basis of Lojkine's analysis 
of urbanization. For Marx
"The revolution in the modes of production of industry
and agriculture made necessary a revolution in the
general conditions of the social process of
production i.e. in the means of communication and 
transport". (Capital 1,p.384»quoted in Lojkine,1976,p*120)
(1) On this point see also Lojkine,1976,pp.125-4*
Although the original concept as used by Marx does not specifically 
refer to urbanization, Lojkine contends that factors have subsequently 
arisen which necessitate the extension of the concept and its 
application to an analysis of this process.
1.3 Circulation
Although the concept of CIRCULATION of capital is not the only 
factor of importance in explaining urbanization for Lojkine it is 
nevertheless a useful point of entry into the Marxist debate.
( the other factors will be dealt with below). For both Lojkine 
and Lamarche an analysis of the processes which shape urban space 
must be in terms of the relation of space to the capitalist economic 
system, the link between the two being based on the concept of 
circulation. By circulation is meant,
"... exchanges considered in their totality: 
transactions involving the buying and selling of 
labour power, of means of production and of 
finished products. In other words, circulation 
embraces all economic activities which PRECEDE 
or follow the production process; thus, strictly 
speaking, it is located OUTSIDE THE SPHERE OF 
PRODUCTION." (Lamarche, 1976, pp.86-87, my emphasis)
Circulation thus refers to the various transactions in which money 
is exchanged for labour power, raw materials etc. prior to the 
production process, and for the product at the end of the production
4.
process (i.e. the "realization” of the product in its money form). 
Thus,
it is through circulation that the capitalist 
converts his fortune into productive capital and 
extracts, with the sale of commodities, the 
surplus value created in production," (Lamarche,
1976,p.87).
The importance of the words emphasised above relates to the
(2 )centrality of the labour theory of value in Marxian economics.' ' 
According to this theory, the value of a product leaving the 
production process derives from the labour crystallized in it; it 
therefore follows that only capital engaged in the production sphere 
is capable of being expanded (through the production process) and 
therefore of creating"surplus value", Herin lies the significance of 
the words emphasised in the quotation from Lamarche (pp,3~4 above), 
since it follows that capital engaged in the sphere of circulation, 
being located OUTSIDE of the sphere of production, is capital lost to 
the process of accumulation since circulation does not involve pro­
ductive activity. Despite this circulation remains a crucial factor 
in the process of accumulation of capital, for capital accumulation 
may result from the production of surplus value but the RATE of 
accumulation depends on the AMOUNT of capital put to work in the 
production sphere AND also on the SPEED or rotation of capital. The 
capitalist city is thus, according to both Lojkine and Lamarche, a
(2) For a full and critical assessment of this concept see Howard and 
King, 1975* especially chapter 5; Eldred and Roth,1978;
Shaikh,1978* and Veisskopf,1978.
spatial form which reduces the INDIRECT costs of production, 
circulation and consumption and therefore speeds the rotation of 
capital•
1,4 Historical materialist epistemology and urban structure.
Thus far, all that has been elaborated is the fact that the city 
has a functional role to play in the process of capitalist accumulation 
and this in itself is insufficient to fully explain the phenomenon*
To fully explain the city within capitalism we must do more than 
just analyse its ROLE, we must determine its NATURE, and to do the 
latter it is necessary to attempt an understanding of the processes 
which structure and shape urban space within capitalism* In other 
words, it is necessary to distinguish between the "city within 
capitalism" and the " capitalist city"*
For Castells,
"**. the distinction between functions and processes..* 
do not have signification if they are not related 
to theoretically significant elements that situate 
the content of space in the social structure as a 
whole."' (Castells,1977»P*124)
Castells treats space as a material product which interrelates with
other material elements and contends that it therefore follows that
any theory of space must attempt to discover the structural and
conjunctural laws governing its existence and transformation. In 
rejecting the ecological theories of the Chicago School and those
which are based on similar premises, Castells attempts to put a 
new THEORETICAL framework in its place, suggesting that much urban 
sociology is ideology rather than science*
"... urban sociology is not an empirical or concep­
tual specification, but its very definition 
implicitly assumes an entire * theory* of society: 
the forms of space produce social relations and 
the physical characteristics of human territorial 
collectivities determine their cultural models of 
behaviour. This is in fact one of the most 
advanced versions of naturalism and of the organ- 
icism of the origins of functionalism. Such a 
•theory* is extremely useful to ruling political elites 
inasmuch as it conceptualizes social organization as 
depending less on social data, in particular class 
relations, than on natural, spatial, technical and 
biological data. As a consequence, any action for 
reform or any action for control is examined using 
the objective technical terminology of the organ­
ization of space. Hence, urban planning by technocrats 
replaces the political debates between social groups." 
(Castells, 1977a*PP«62-3)
However, this criticism of ecological and cultural theories of urban 
sociology as being "ideological" should not be seen as merely a 
reflection of Castell*s own NORMATIVE preference. Rather, its basis 
is to be found in Castell*s epistemology and methodology, both of
which are influenced by an Althusserian reading of Marx*
According to Althusser (1970), Marxism constituted a SCIENCE « 
that is, historical materialism - in the field of political economy. 
Castells aim is to found such a science in the theoretical space 
occupied by urban sociology, and there is therefore a need to separate 
"ideological" aspects of the knowledge produced from those which 
have scientific relevance. For both Althusser and Castells, the term 
"science" , by definition, refers to historical materialism, the 
science of SOCIAL FORMATIONS and, according to Castells, it is only
by working from the premises of historical materialism that we are
able to fully explain the phenomenon which has been termed the "urban"
"... the problematic proper to any theory of space 
(consists), on the epistemological plane, in 
discovering structural laws or the composition of 
historically given situations and, on the strictly
theoretical plane, in establishing hypotheses as to
the dominant factor of a structure in which, obviously, 
all schools include the totality of elements of social 
life." (Castells,1977,P.121)
To do this,
"... one must go further than the ideological opposition 
between the determination of space by nature and its 
shaping by culture, to unite these two terms in a 
problematic that recognizes the specificity of the
humanly social, without seeing it as a deliberate /
creation which cannot be explained by laws* v ' 
to the common ideological front of culturalism 
and historicism, we must oppose a theoretical 
front that integrates the ecological, materialist- 
based problematic in a sociological analysis whose 
central theme is the contradictory action of social 
agents (social classes), but whose foundation is the 
structural web that creates the problematic of any 
society - that is to say, the way in which a social 
formation fashions nature, and the mode of distribution 
and administration, and therefore of contradition, that 
stems from it." (Castells,1977»P*122)*
As is implied in the latter quote, Castells maintains that it 
is necessary to approach the analysis of space in terms of social 
structure* However, a merely DESCRIPTIVE analysis of this structure 
(in terms of the mechanisms of interaction between locations and 
activities) is not enough; rather, it is also necessary to attempt 
to discover the structural LAWS of the production and functioning of 
the spatial forms studied and, for Castells, this can only be done 
by applying the fundamental concepts of historical materialism to the 
analysis. Space must be analysed in terms of its shaping by elements 
of the economic system, the political system and the ideological 
system, and by their combinations and the social practices that derive 
from them*
(3) c*f* Poulantzas,1975» on "the problematic of the subject*"
”••• any concrete society and therefore any social 
form (for example, space) may he understood in 
terms of the historical articulation of social modes 
of production. By mode of production I do not mean 
the type of productive activities, hut the particular 
MATRIX OP COMBINATIONS of the fundamental instances 
(systems of practices) of the social structures 
essentially the economic, the politico-institutional 
and the ideological. The economic, namely the way 
in which the 'worker*, with the help of certain means of 
production, transforms nature (object of labour) in 
order to produce the commodities necessary for social 
existence, determines, in the final resort, a 
particular form of the matrix, that is to say, the 
laws of the mode of production. The combinations and 
transformations between the different systems and elements 
of a structure are brought about by the mediation of the 
social practices, that is to say, by the action of men, 
determined by their particular location in the structure 
thus defined.” (Castells,1977tP*125» niy emphasis)*
1*5 Conclusion
It may be useful at this point to abstract and summarise the
main points of the debate on urban space thus far elaborated, both for
the sake of clarity and in order to demonstrate the integral place
they have for the wider discussion. From the above discussion, it is
possible to abstract three main tenants of the Marxist analysis of 
urbanizations
10.
1) the development of urban agglomeration is the result of 
the dynamic of capitalism, especially of capitalism1s 
constant tendency to reduce both production time and the 
time it takes for capital to circulate#
2) circulation, although necessary to capital accumulation, 
is located outside of the production sphere and therefore 
the circulation sphere cannot itself create surplus value.
3) both the function and the production of urban space must 
be analysed in terms of the underlying social structure. 
Structural laws govern the production and functioning
of spatial forms, therefore urban space must be analysed in 
terms of its shaping by elements of the economic system, 
the political system and the ideological system, the economic 
being the last resort determinant#
The importance of the above will become apparent in the following 
chapters#
11.
CHAPTER 2: CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND THE SHAPING OF URBAN SPACE
2.1 Introduction
The "political economy" approach to the analysis of urban space 
has come to have a dominant influence within urban sociology. Thus 
far, however, we have been mainly concerned with the main method­
ological and epistemological premises underlying the approach and 
it remains to reduce the level of abstraction and to turn to a 
consideration of how such a theory is applied to concrete situations. 
The following sections will demonstrate this aspect of Marxian 
analysis of capitalist urban systems and in the process the inherent 
contradictions within the capitalist mode of production as actualised 
within the concrete urban system will become apparent, and the 
mechanisms evolved to attempt to resolve such contradicitions will 
lead to an analysis of the role of the State,
2.2 Economic forces and the suburbanization process
Much of the work by David Harvey addresses itself to the demon­
stration and analysis of the concrete manifestations of the dynamics 
of the capitalist mode of production within urban systems. Rejecting 
"liberal formulations" of the theory necessary for understanding the 
generation of inequality in the city and associated theories for 
examining the relationship between social processes and spatial forms, 
Harvey concludes that such theories avoid coming to terms with the 
context of the problems they seek to study, capitalism and its key 
relationships.
Harvey, in articles on the housing market in Baltimore 
(Harvey,1976 and 1977)» empirically demonstrates this relationship 
between urbanization and the economic system, placing particular 
emphasis on the importance of economic growth processes. Urbanization 
is shown to involve processes of fixed capital formation which are 
"mediated" through a structure of financial institutions which thus 
have both general and highly localized impacts on the urbanization 
process. Harvey particularly concentrates on the process of sub­
urbanization which he relates to the actions of financial (and sub­
sequently tate) institutions reJating to the " underconsumption" 
problems of the 1930fs by stimulating demand via this suburbanization 
process - a process involving the construction of housing, shopping 
centres and commercial functions which in turn generated a rising 
demand for automobiles, energy, consumer durables and the construction 
industry.
However, the interpretation of suburbanization (as one example
of the shaping of urban space by economic forces) as a policy designed
to resolve problems of underconsumption within capitalism is problematic.
It is not here disputed that the suburbanization process generated an
economic boom which made a significant contribution to both the ongoing
(1)stability and profitability of capitalism, especially in the U.S.A. 7 
However, the same phenomenon could also be subjected to a different 
interpretation based on the importance of the dynamics of capitalist 
PRODUCTION, rather than consumption or reproduction,
Baran and Sweeny (1966,pp,218-238), for example, argue that capital 
investment in the automobile and all its spinoffs (of which sul>»
(1) The American example is mainly used here because firstly the 
suburbanization process was most pronounced in that country and because, 
not unnaturally, most critical analysis has therefore focussed on the 
American experience.
urbanization was one), though largely unanticipated and unplanned,
had the same effects of rescuing the U.S. economy from a period of
stagnation and underwrote the economic boom of the 1920*s • On the
other hand, however, it is undeniable that policies and trends outwith
the production sphere have had similar effects. Harvey*s work on the
effects of the policies of finance capital have been referred to above,
and one could also cite the legislation enacted by the U.S. federal
government during the 1930*s. (e.g. the formation of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation in 1932 and the Federal Housing 
(2}Authority in 1934 )* which had the overall effect of creating
subsidies for low-density, detached, owner-occupied single family 
housing to the virtual exclusion of other types of dwelling units and 
therefore effectively subsidized the development of suburbs since 
space was generally lacking in the central cities.
However, it is not intended that the two interpretations should 
be subjected to critical analysis and assessment at this point for it 
is undeniable that the spheres of production and consumption within 
capitalism are inextricably linked - the dynamics of one sphere having 
effects on the other - and the point to be demonstrated in this chapter 
is merely that the dynamics of the economic base in general do effect 
urban shape and form. Nevertheless, the differences in interpretation 
should at least be noted, for they have implications for the Marxian 
analysis of the state discussed below. The reasons for the emphasis 
on the dynamics of the consumption/reproduction sphere relate to the 
fact that it is historically useful for leading on to an analysis of 
the role of the tate and therefore an approach which has been adopted 
by a majority of Marxist authors.
(2) See Potter, 1974, Chapters 4 and 5; and Tabb and Sawyers 1978.
2.3 The limitations of orthodox economic analysis
However, before the Marxist approach is discussed it is necessary 
to elaborate some of the main tenets of orthodox economic theories 
of the same phenomenon and to examine the reasons for their rejection 
by Marxist writers.
Orthodox economic theory v 7 relies on price and allocation 
theory to explain the internal functioning of parts of the urban 
economy. Changes in demand, working through the price mechanism, 
(theoretically) bring about alterations in resource allocation. It is 
taken as axiomatic within such approaches that resources will 
automatically be used in the most efficient way because producers, 
in striving to maximize profits, must respond to consumer demand as 
well as producing any given output at the lowest possible cost. It is 
further assumed that the price mechanism also ensures that consumer 
satisfaction is maximised since it is reasonable to assume that each 
consumer spends his income in such a way as to maximize his satisfaction, 
and the profit motive sees to it that the desired goods and services 
are forthcoming.
Apart from the normative and heuristic assumptions implicit in such 
theories, the limitations and weaknesses of liberal equilibrium analysis 
begin to show themselves when applied to concrete historical situations, 
and especially when applied to an analysis of the urban economy. 
Difficulties are also encountered when attempting to apply market 
principles IN PRACTICE, again especially in an urban situation* Among 
the most important for our purposes here are the following:
(3) This section relies heavily on Goodall, 1972; Henderson and 
Ledebur, 1972; and Richardson.
there is the problem of externalities (which, being a well~ 
documented, area requires no further elaboration here, but 
see Goodall, 1972, Richardson, 1977)^^
market equilibrium theories and applied market principles 
break down because of monopolistic factors and tendencies 
inherent within the urban economy. There are two main 
reasons why the monopoly element is particularly prevalent 
in urban situations:
(a) the non-transferability of land in geographical 
space means that every site has a unique spatial 
relationship with all other sites (see Lamarche,1976 below) 
and,
(b) the fragmentation of ownership of urban land may prevent 
some land being transferred to its most efficient use.
This may occur when the most efficient use requires
the amalgamation of adjacent plots and some owners 
refuse to co-operate because they hope to take advantage 
of their monopoly position, (c.f,. Richardson, 1977$ and. 
Lamarche and Lojkine,1976 below).
(c) finally, and for our purposes here, more significantly, 
orthodox equilibrium theory and, more importantly, attempts 
to apply orthodox market principles break down when it 
comes to the provision of goods for which there are no /
(4) But see Offe*s (1975) use of the concept of "externalities" 
discussed below.
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prices (e.g. collective goods and services), Many 
aspects of the urban economy are concerned with 
just such goods and services and, since there is no 
market in which the profit motive can guide resources 
into their provision, it becomes difficult, if not 
impossible, for free market principles to determine the 
value society places on them and the extent to which 
resources should be used in their provision despite the 
fact that the provision of these non-profit goods and 
services is crucial to the success and efficiency of 
private profit-making ventures. (Offe»1975)•
2.4 Circulation and capital fractions
The price mechanism, therefore, rather obviously fails to piPvide 
anything resembling the most efficient use of resources and indeed 
a number of urban problems have arisen from imperfections and mal— 
functionings which were a legacy of the market mechanism. In 
rejecting equilibrium demand-supply theories, Marxist analysis focusses 
attention on the capacity and tendency of the capitalist mode of 
production to itself generated the conditions necessary for its 
continued existence. However, despite their insistence that, in the 
last instance, it is production rather than distribution which is of 
primary importance, most Marxist analyses have focussed attention on 
the importance of the distributive consequences of urban allocation 
and growth, and the allocative mechanisms underlying them#
For Marxists, the growth of the city involves the transfer of profits 
and investment from the production sphere (in Marxian terminology
17
"expenses capital" or "deductions from surplus value" ) into the sphere 
of finance capital and property capital. It has "been shown above how 
in times of crisis the policies of finance capital and property 
capital have acted to stabilise capitalism*s productive sphere(see 
Harvey 1976 and 1977 above) — however, Marxists do not see this 
as the role of finance capital and property capital ONLY in times of 
crisis: rather, the three spheres are seen as being structurally
and functionally interrelated and interdependent and, as will be shown 
by Lamarche*s analysis of property capital below, both finance capital 
and property capital, being part of the logic of capital accumulation, 
their role must be analysed in terms of capitalism*s need to continually 
secure the general conditions necessary for accumulation.
It is at this point that the importance of the concept of 
circulation (see 1.3 above) is again evident. The need to reduce the
amount of capital engaged in circulation at any one time results,
according to Lamarche, in a DIVISION OP LABOUR in which different
FRACTIONS of capital emerge, each with a particular function*
"In this way, total social capital can be divided 
into three types, each with a specialized function:
(a) industrial capital which control the process of 
production... of surplus value; (b) commercial 
capital which controls the circulation of commodity «* 
capital; and (c) financial capital which controls 
the circulation of money capital." (Lamarche,1976,p.88)
2.5 Property capital, differential rent and the shaping of urban space
The last two fractions are concerned with ensuring that as little 
capital as possible is tied up in either commodities or in liquid 
form and that such capital as is tied up is returned as quickly as 
possible to the production sphere. Having outlined the process 
and role of circulation and the two specialized capitals devoted to 
it, Lamarche goes on to demonstrate that, spatial organization 
and distance being a possible source of circulation costs, it is 
necessary to conceive of another fraction of capital - property capital 
operating in the circulation sphere whose particular function is the
plan and equip space in order to reduce the indirect costs of the other
three spheres and therefore increase their efficiency.
Property capital, for Lamarche, has a "planning1 role in the way 
it selects sites, and an "equipping" role in the types of buildings 
it develops on them. However, property capital is NOT engaged in the 
production sphere (construction) but in the circulation sphere,where 
it
"... plays the same role at the level of property 
as does commercial capital at the level of movable 
goods: buying in order to sell at a higher price ...
Its own commodity is floor-space let (i.e. sold over
a very long term) by the square foot. It can thus
be distinguished from capital invested in the 
building industry in that the latter produces a concrete 
good, the building, whereas property capital merely 
realizes the metamorphosis of the building into money 
form." (Lamarche, 1976,p.93)
The fact that the profits of property capital are a result of 
buying and letting of floor space or buildings and not of buying 
and selling of buildings has important effects for urban space 
because of the factors involved in determining rents.
2.6 The concept of differential rent.
Lamarche argues that "rents" depend not only on construction costs 
and the cost of capital immobilized in a building but also on what is 
termed "differential rents I and II". Differential rent I
" "... is a function of the advantages offered by the
site of a property, and which do not depend directly 
on any action by the owner... This rent is termed 
differential because the situational advantages on 
which it is based are not evenly distributed throughout 
space." (Lamarche,1976,p.100).
Lamarche identifies two sources from which differential rent I may 
originate and accrue to an individual property developer (apart, that 
is, from natural and environmental causes) s
(1) from the actions of other private investors (e.g. an apartment 
block built by another developer in the vincinity of a 
shopping centre will be mutually beneficial to each and will 
therefore have the effect of raising differential rent I ), and
(2) from the effects of public investments (e.g. access to transport 
facilities, school, hospitals etc.)
Differential rent II on the other hand does not depend primarily 
on the locations of the property. Rather
it is based ... on advantages contained 
within the limits of the property, advantages 
which depend primarily on the characteristics of 
the occupants ...
(Thus) ••• It is primarily in commercial and 
office developments that the role of differential 
rent II becomes apparent; because it is in this 
type of case that the activities of the various 
tenants can be mutually advantageous•"
(Lamarche, 1976,pp.101-2)
If we follow Lamarche's analysis of property capital and his 
theory of rent then ( acc. to Pickvance, 1976) four main conclusions 
can be drawn which have importance for an analysis of the shaping of 
urban space, for property capital will
(a) concentrate its developments in areas with good 
situational advantages,
(b) order high rise buildings in such areas (to multiply 
the mass of differential rent I extracted)f
(c) favour developments where tenants have complementary 
functions (and for which differential rent II can be 
extracted), and
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(d) favour large developments (for the last reason
and to internalize more situational advantages
in the form of differential rent I )•
2*7 Theory and reality: the need for mediation
Thus it becomes clear how the logic economic of capital accumu­
lation can shape urban space and Lamarche uses the example of Montreal 
as empirical evidence for his conclusions*
However, Lamarche*s argument does have its weaknesses. We have 
seen how Lamarche starts from Marxist economic theory (particularly 
with regard to the circulation sphere) and from it deduces what form 
the activities of propery capital will take in planning and equipping 
urban space* As such, it has been pointed out by Pickvance (1976) 
that it contains the limitations and disadvantages inherent in any 
economic model, namely that "••• it is concerned with TENDENCIES which
will appear in reality to a greater or lesser degree according to how
far the initial assumptions are met*" (Pickvance,1976,pp*15-l6)#
However, this weakness, although true, is a relatively minor one 
for, while it is indisputable that concrete reality rarely fully 
corresponds to explanatory theory, nevertheless, in admitting the principle 
we can still differentiate the degree* Lamarche's analysis, being 
based on historical materialism avoids the ahistoricism of classical 
economic theories and models - that is, its premises are themselves 
based on concrete historical situations (cf* Paulantzas 1975)* Theory 
based on such premises, therefore, is always based on real processes 
and, as such, allows of mediation by particular concrete,historical
circumstances (cf* Harloe,1977)*
Indeed, in many respects this so-called "weakness” is of central
importance to the Marxist theory of the local btate, for the
/show
"tendencies" such an analysis demonstrates clearly that, if allowed 
a free reign, the dynamics of capitalist accumulation would generate
contradicit /on sufficient to eventually destroy the whole system*
/ ___
In other words, the "tendencies" NEED to he mediated in order for
the capitalist system to survive and, as will be shown below,
this mediation must of necessity come from outwith the capitalist mode
of production itself*
2.8 Conclusion
It is with reference to this need for mediation that Marxists 
have analyzed the role of the State* However, to turn directly to 
an analysis of the State at this juncture would be premature for 
further elaboration of the need for, and the type of, mediation is 
still required and this will be the focus of the collowing chapter*
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CHAPTER 3: STATE PROVISION OF URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE AND COLLECTIVE
COMSUMPTION. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LABOUR
THEORY OF VALUE AS AN EXPLANATORY DEVICE,
3*1 Introduction*
The preceeding two Chapters have dealt with the form, function 
and nature of the city within capitalism and it has been suggested 
that the city must be analysed in terms of the underlying economic 
framework. It has been shown that the city is the spatial environment 
which best accommodates the accumulation process of capitalism and 
that private capital has had a role in shaping the urban system. 
However, there are other aspects relating to urbanization which 
have not yet been dealt with, particularly those related to the role of 
the public sector. As will be demonstrated below, any discussion of
urbanization and the public sector (or the state) must be seen in the
light of the contradictions inherent within the capitalist mode of 
production, contradictions which require "mediation" from outwith the 
mode of production itself.
Despite the fact that a critique of the Chicago School has been 
the point of departure for most Marxist urban sociology, alternative 
Marxist analysis has displayed a wide variety of focus and emphasis. 
Some studies (e*g. Harvey, 1973 and. 1976) have emphasized the need to 
analyse urbanization and the role of the state in terms of the 
construction of the social infrastructure or the formation of fixed 
immobable capital, while others (e.g. Castells 1977*1978) have analysed 
the phenomenon in terms of the provision of collective consumption. 
However, the difference in emphasis is more the result of individual
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academic interest than of any fundamental rejection of the alternative 
position and most Marxist analysis takes into account the importance 
of both*
5*2 Socialization, urbanization and obstacles to both.
Cities are obviously the location of key production and distribution 
activities in capitalist economies, although of course the economic 
role of cities varies. Cities contain enormous fixed capital 
investments reflecting their diverse economic functions (e,g* offices, 
manufacturing units, banks etc,) and their growth and decline are 
intricately linked-with developments in capitalism. At a more 
general level the role of cities, as has been shown above, must be 
seen in terms of capitalism1 s need to increase its productivity by 
socializing (i,e, turning into a collective activity) the general 
conditions of capitalist accumulation (of, Cockbum 19775 Lojkins,1976* 
Gough,1975? O’Connor,1975} Tabb and Sawyers,1978 etc.),
"Cooperation allows of the work being carried on 
over an extended space •••• On the other hand, 
while extending the scale of production, it renders 
possible a relative contraction of the arena, This 
contraction of the arena simultaneous with, and 
arising from, extension of scale, whereby a 
number of useless expenses are cut down, is owing 
to the conglomeration of labourers, to the 
aggregation of various processes, and to the 
concentration of the means of production,"
(l.Marx, "Capital 1" quoted in Lojkine,1976)
However, the fact that the city is functional for capital 
accumulation in no way allows us to conclude that the dynamics of 
capitalist accumulation will necessarily ensure its development* 
Lojkine cites two major reasons for this:
"•••• on the one hand, because every increase 
in productivity, by raising the organic 
composition of social capital, ultimately 
strengthens the tendency for the rate of 
profit to fall and leads to a counteiv-reaction 
which CHECKS and "selects" the development of 
productive forces ; and, on the other hand, 
because the need for cooperation among the 
different agents of production in urban space 
is contradicted by:
(a) the laws of capitalist competition 
(»> the parcelling out of urban space into 
independent fragments which are the 
private property of LAND-OWNERS. This 
second limit is that of URBAN GROUND RENT*"
(Lojkine,1976,p*127)
Thus, Lojkine identifies three obstacles to the process of urban 
development*
1) Financial
Services (or in Marxist terminology "useful effects") provided by 
collective consumption, according to Lojkine, will not be provided by
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private capital because their financing is not profitable#
Lojkine explains this unprofitability by taking as axiomatic 
Marxfs theory of "the tendency for the rate of profit to fall" and 
attempting to demonstrate that urban expenditure plays the same role 
as regards the organic composition of social capital as does the use 
of machinery. For Lojkine, the sole use value of urban space consists 
of its capacity to facilitate interaction between the different 
elements of the city; however, these useful effects
"•••• are certainly use values but in no sense 
are they material objects, products which 
could serve as physical supports of the value 
imparted by labour power, Marx showed that the 
creation of commodities, supports for the 
contradiction between value and use value, 
presupposed the "alienation" of the product 
from the production process, the separation of 
the product in which the value created by labour 
power could be CRYSTALLIZED. Such is not the 
case for useful effects or "services" as long as 
their use value is not crystallized in any material 
object." (Lojkine,1976,p,129)
Nor do these useful effects
"#., add more value to commodities produced in 
other sectors. Thus they do not create any 
additional value and are totally unproductive
(of surplus value) ", (Lojkine,1976, p,130)
Lojkine thus concludes that capital expenditure on collective 
consumption is the result of a DEDUCTION from the surplus value 
already produced - that is, "Expenses capital" - such compares it to 
constant capital, contending that this expenses capital
"••• acts on the organic composition of 
capital in the same way as constant capital: it 
RAISES THE ORGANIC COMPOSITION BY INCREASING THE 
MASS OF ACCUMULATED SOCIAL CAPITAL WITHOUT 
ITSELF BEING PRODUCTIVELY UTILIZED." (Lojkine,
1976,p.ljl).
2 ) The anarchic competition of capitalism
Lojkine contrasts the organization of cooperation WITHIN the 
productive sphere with what he describes as the "anarchy" manifested at 
the level of the TERRITORIAL division of labour, the latter being the 
result of competition between capitalist firms.
" •••• the locational criteria used by big 
capitalist firms are entering into contradiction 
with the TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL NECESSITIES 
of any real territorial planning, i.e. of 
developed cooperation at the level of the nation 
as a whole." (Lojkine, 1976,p.l34)
5) The private ownership of land.
Marx stressed the role of land
(1) See also Preteceille,1976; and Poulantzas 1975 ,p.166,on this point.
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(a) as an INSTRUMENT of production, and
(b) as a simple PASSIVE SUPPORT of the means of production.
However, with the growing importance of the socialization of 
the means of production Lojkine argues that a third role takes 
on a growing importance and that the private ownership of land is 
increasingly an obstacle to the performance of this function. This 
is
"•••• its capacity for CONCENTRATION, i.e. for 
SOCIALLY COMBINING the means of production 
and means of reproduction of a social formation.”
(Lojkine,1976,p. 135)
However, as
" A consequence of the private appropriation of 
land, the FRAGMENTATION of this use value - whose 
consumption, by definition, cannot be other than 
collective - is becoming an obstacle, within the 
capitalist mode of production, to the development 
of social productive forces.” (Lojkine,1976,p*135)
However, Lojkine*s analysis can be criticised on several points.
(1) Not every increase in productivity necessarily raises the organic 
composition of social capital. Also, it does not necessarily 
follow that, even if the organic composition of capital were 
raised, the rate of profit would tend to fall since it 
could be argued that the provision of urban infrastructure /
and collective consumption can bring about a corresponding 
increase in the productivity of variable capital (i.e.
Q
labour) and so maintain the overall ratio of r = _______ #
C + V
However, this is possibly merely a semantic point based on 
two literal an interpretation of the text.
(2) Even in broadening the scope of interpretation weaknesses 
in Lojkine's argument can still be found for the validity 
of the theory of the tendency for the rate of profit to 
fall is problematic and is currently the object of consider­
able debate (See Hodgson,1974» Steedman,1975»Howard and King,
1975, Shaikh,1978, Weisskopf,1978). As will become evident 
later this weakness is not a fatal flaw in the Marxist 
argument but, as it is of importance for a critical 
assessment of the wider Marxist debate on the state, it is 
worthwhile to examine this point in detail.
3*3 The Theory of the filling rate of profit: a critical analysis.
Although Marx himself nowhere gives a fully integrated exposition 
of his theory of the falling rate of profit, the theory has been 
developed and elaborated by subsequent writers who base their analysis 
on Marx*s analysis of the connection between values, prices and profits.v
Marx normally described the economy in terms of VALUE (i.e. socially 
necessary labour time) quantities such as C (constant capital),
(2) this section draws heavily on Howard and King,1975* Eldred and 
Roth,1978; Hodgson,1974; and Steedman,1975; and Shaikh,1978.
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V (variable capital) and s(surplus value). Using these 
variables three key ratios
(a) the organic composition of capital (g)
(b) the rate of exploitation (e)
(c) the rate of profit (r)
are usually defined as follows:
« = $ 0)
• - I- (2)y
r = a (3)
C + V
With these definitions the rate of profit can be expressed 
in terms of the other two ratios as follows:
r =   ■= _ 1 _  (4)
c/y + y/v g + i
Thus, the rate of profit (r) is directly related to the rate 
of exploitation (e) and inversely related to the organic composition 
of capital (g). The principal hypothesis underlying the theory of 
the rising organic composition of capital' is that the process of 
capitalist development involves changing conditions of production in 
which the ratio of caistant to variable capital(g) tends to rise and,
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assuming that (e) does not change very much, it then follows from
equation (4) that (r) will tend to fall.
However, this in itself is not sufficient to prove the theory 
since, although the organic composition increases, this will, given 
a fixed subsistance wage, itself produce an increasing rate of 
exploitation since net output for man is growing* Thus the net 
effect will depend on the respective magnitudes of change in the organic 
composition AND the rate of exploitation* Marx argues, however, 
that, although the rate of exploitation increases with the organic 
composition, it will after some point increase LESS RAPIDLY so that
there must come a point after which the rate of profit will begin to
fall.
The reasons for this are as follows. The time workers put into 
the production process is determined by the length of the working day (L)* 
The time necessary to reproduce themselves (V), on the other hand, 
is determined by both the amount of goods they consume (their 'real 
wage') and by the labour time it takes to produce these goods. The mass 
of surplus value (s) and the rate of exploitation (s/v) can therefore 
be increased in two wayss directly, by
(1) lengthening the working day (l) so that surplus labour 
time is increased;
(2) lowering the necessary labour time (v) so that more of a 
given working day is spent in surplus labour time*
This method requires that either
(a) workers real wages be reduced, 
or that
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(b) the productivity of their labour be raised (so that 
it takes them less time to produce their means of 
consumption), 
or both.
However, as Marx foresaw, there are limits to (1) for:
"The compensation of a decrease in the number of 
labourers employed, or the amount of variable 
capital advanced, by a rise in the rate of surplus 
value, or by the lengthening of the working day, 
has impassible limits. Whatever the value of labour 
power may be ... the total value that a labourer 
can produce, day in, day out, is always less than 
the value in which 24 hours of labour are embodied.
The absolute limit of the average working day - this 
being by nature always less than 24 days - sets an 
absolute limit to the compensation of a reduction of 
variable capital by a higher rate of rusplus value."
(Capital 1, 305t quoted in Howard and King,1975)
Secondly, because of working-class pressure, it is difficult to 
achieve (2) by reducing real wages. Therefore, increasing the 
productivity of labour has come to be the princ^iple^means of raising the 
rate of exploitation. However, Marx argued that as capitalism develops 
and the rate of exploitation rises it becomes increasingly more difficult 
to shorten the necessary labour time by an increase in productivity 
and thus raise the rate of surplus value even further#
"The larger the surplus value of capital •••• or, 
the smaller the fractional part of the working 
day ••• which expresses necessary labour, the smaller 
is the increase in surplus value which capital 
obtains from the increase of productive force. Its 
surplus value rises, but in an even smaller relation 
to the development of the productive force ...
The smaller already the fractional part falling to 
necessary labour, the greater the surplus labour, the 
less can any increase in productive force perceptibly 
diminish necessary labour." (Grundrisse,p.340» 
quoted in Howard and King, 1975) •
Thus, according to Howard and King,
"... in Marx*s view, not only are there certain
insurmountable limits to the rate of increase of 
the rate of exploitation, while there are no such 
limited to the rate of increase of the organic 
composition; but an increasing organic composition 
at an increasing rate due to the centralization of 
capital is coupled with a tendency for the rate of 
exploitation to decelerate over time. Thus, Marx 
argues, if the organic composition continues to take 
the path he expected, there must come a point after 
which the rate of profit declines." (Howard and King,1975*)
When then should the organic composition of capital increase if it
lowers the rate of profit? Marx held that it would do so because of the
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COMPETITIVE nature of the capitalist system whereby individual capitals )
are constantly forced to lower unit costs in order to gain an edge 
over their competitors. Beyond a certain point however, as has been 
demonstrated above, mechanization (c) arises as the principle means 
d.f raising the productivity of labour and hence lowering unit costs.
Thus, ever larger amounts of means of production and materials are 
set into operation by a given number of workers. According to Marx, 
this is turn implies that out of the total labour value C + L 
(where L = V + S) of the final product, progressively more comes 
from the means of production used up and progressively less from 
living labour.
c
The rate of profit, as shown above, is --- . But S = L « V,
C + V
since surplus labour time (s) equals the time workers actually put 
in (L) MINUS the time necessary to reproduce themselves (v ) .  Thus, 
even if V = 0 (zero), the MOST that S could be is
S max as _L
C C
Consequently, ~ is the ceiling to the rate of profit while the floor
is zero; therefore, if a rising technical (organic) composition is
C Lindeed a rising ratio r- (hence a falling ratio 77 ) then the actual
li u
range of the rate of profit will become narrower and therefore exhibit 
a DOWNWARD TENDENCY.
However, it has been argued that mechanization does not NECESSARILY
mean that the rate of profit will fall. If L is given, mechanization
merely means that the mass of means of production used by these workers 
increases. But this is also accompanied by a rise in the productivity 
of labour and, since it now takes less time to produce a given commodity,
a fall in the labour value of commodities. Therefore the labour value 
of the means of production (c) will not rise as fast as their mass. 
Marx’s argument that (c) will nevertheless increase ( so that C/L 
will rise and the falling tendency will operate) is debatable for 
suppose the labour value of the means of production were to fall as 
fast or even faster than its mass rises then C/L will itself stay 
constant or even fall, and no downward tendency will be exerted on 
the rate of profit.
This gap in Marx’s argument is still very much the subject of
debate. However, what is important for our purposes is that the fall
in C/L is hypothetically possible. It is thus inappropriate to use
the falling rate of profit theory to explain the state’s role in
providing urban infrastructure and collective consumption —
inappropriate because not only is the theory itself problematic but
also, ahd perhaps more importantly, because the theory - even if it 
unnecessary
were valid - is/as an explanatory device for an analysis of the 
phenomenon.
3.4 Profitability: the transformation problem.
We have shown above that Lojkine argues that, since expenses 
capital is not productively utilized (but does increase the mass of 
accumulated social capital) it increases the organic composition of 
capital. However, why should unproductive capital increase the ORGANIC 
composition of capital? The two are not necessarily the same, and 
the link between expenses capital and constant capital is tenuous 
and Lojkine's analysis doesn't prove otherwise. Lojkine contends that 
expenses capital and capital engaged in productive activity differ 
not in kind but only in degree of ’devalorization* (. unproductivity).
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However, this argument, as Pickvance (1976) points out, rests on a 
shift from value accounting to price accounting procedures and, as 
will be demonstrated below, this undermines Lojkine's argument#
The problem of moving from value accounting to price accounting is 
known as the "transformation problem". While the rate of profit is 
expressed in price terms, the analysis from which its tendency to 
fall is expressed in VALUE terms and, if we investigate Marx's 
analysis of the TRANSFORMED form of surplus-value - i.e. average profit — 
we can demonstrate the weakness in Lojkine's analysis.
Marx attacked the classical identification of values with 
(equilibrium) prices, and surplus value with profit because this error 
served to mystify the ORIGINS of profit. Marx attempted to show that 
profit was nothirg more than surplus value redistributed between 
individual capitalists operating with DIFFERENT organic compositions 
of capital. The total amount of profit, and also the average rate of 
profit on capital employed, could be completely and consistently 
explained in terms of the labour theory of value. The transformation 
problem, for Marx, only arises when capitalism is sufficiently well 
developed for competition, and the resulting mobility of capital, to 
actually give rise to a tendency for the equalization of the rate of 
profit in different sectors of the economy.
How, then, did Marx attempt to prove that a coherent theory of 
prices must necessarily be derived from the labour theory of valie?
The analysis of the transformation of surplus-value into average 
profit starts from the concept of "cost-price" and the distinction 
between the production of new value V + S) and the transfer of old 
value (c) is suspended in practice: therefore K = C + V.
Profit is defined as the difference in magnitude of value between 
selling price of the produced commodity and the cost-price of the 
elements of production. Also, two forms of competition between 
capitals can be distinguisheds
(1) the competition which occurs WITHIN the sphere where the 
producers of the same commodity complete, and
(2) the competition BETWEEN the different spheres of production 
where the aggregate capitals of the different spheres 
compete for a share of the TOTAL surplus-value produced.
The share of the surplus value which accrues to an individual capital
as an end result of this competition is profit (p). Profit, for
Marx, always refers to the return on the total capital advanced. As
opposed to the rate of surplus value (s/v), the rate of profit is _P •
C + V
The production price is that selling price which enables the 
sphere of production to make average profit and the share of one 
sphere of production in the aggregate surplus value is determined by 
the ratio of advanced capital in that sphere of the aggregate capital 
INDEPENDENTLY of the organic composition (C/V) and the turnover of 
variable ; capital (both of which, Marx contends, are nevertheless 
crucial for surplus-value production). Thus, the surplus value which
is produced in one sphere of production does NOT determine the rate
of PROFIT of that sphere. Thus, although average profit DISTRIBUTES 
the aggregate social surplus value to the different spheres of capital,
(3)
and although the magnitude of the rate of profit is influenced
(3) Mara's formula for the precise relationship between value and prices 
has been subsequently disproved (See Howard and King, 1975*P» 143 a M
p.206 ff.) because it gives the correct rate of profit only under certain
circumstances. However, this does not bear on the present argument 
since the RELATIONS between the rate of profit, the rate of exploitation 
and the organic composition of capital still hold even when the formula 
does not. In particular,the rate of profit is still a positive function 
in the rate of surplus value.
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"by the rate of surplus value, the two are not the same. Therefore, 
as Marx himself recognised
"A saving of labour ... and the employment of 
more congealed labour (constant capital),
... do not seem to exert the least influence on 
the general rate of PROFIT and the average 
PROFIT. How could living labour be the SOLE 
source of PROFIT, in view of the fact that a 
reduction in the quantity of labour required for 
production appears not to exert any influence on 
PROFIT? Moreover, it even seems in certain 
circumstances to be the nearest source of an 
increase of profits, at least for the 
INDIVIDUAL capitalist." (Capital III,p.176, 
quoted in Eldred and Roth,1975)
Proof of this point is that Marxist analyses (including that of 
Lojkine) themselves acknowledge the existence of certain forms of 
capital which themselves do not create surplus value. Examples are 
commercial and financial capital discussed above which both appropriate 
that part of social surplus value that corresponds to their share in 
aggregate capital - both commercial and financial profit take the form 
of aggregate profit, the TRANSFORMED form of surplus value.
3.5 Conclusion
However, it is argued here that these criticisms, although under­
mining the particular analysis outlined by Lojkine, do not necessarily
invalidate a Marxist approach. This contention is based on the fact 
that the use of an analysis based on the labour theory of value and 
the falling tendency of the rate of profit is NOT NECESSARY to 
demonstrate WHY it is the state which provides infrastructure and 
collective consumption in order to ensure the general conditions of 
capitalist accumulation and reproduction although, as will be 
demonstrated below, it IS of importance for an understanding of the 
CONSEQUENCES of such intervention. In other words, we can distinguish 
between the reasons for the genesis of a particular phenomenon and 
the factors underpinning the effects of the same phenomenon.
CHAPTER 4: AN ALTERNATIVE MARXIST APPROACH
It has been demonstrated above that collective consumption 
and infrastructure are necessary for capital accumulation and repro­
duction. However, we have not yet discovered satisfactory reasons 
for their provision by the state and not by private capital.
However, to have demonstrated inherent weaknesses in Marx*s
theory of the falling rate of profit is NOT to have totally undermined
any alternative Marxist analysis of the need for state intervention to
secure the conditions of capitalist accumulation. We have criticised
Marx*s analysis of those factors in the PRODUCTION of surplus value
which (supposedly) reduce the rate of profit - but those same factors,
as Marx himself realised, can also lead to an imbalance between
production, sale and purchase and thus to a crisis of (value/profit) 
(1 )REALIZATION. Marx also analysed those factors which lead to a 
reduction in the rate of profit as a DIRECT RESULT of an imbalance 
between the production of surplus value and the circulation process 
necessary to allow its full realization.
With these conditions in mind, we are now in a position to 
formulate an alternative analysis of the phenomenon of state 
intervention in collective consumption.
This focus on the importance of "realization1 of value for 
capital accumulation has been touched upon above in the discussion 
of "circulation" (see 1.3) and the stimulation of demand 
resulting from the process of suburbanization (see 2.2 above)
(l) c.f. Sweezy, 1946, pp. 145-6.
It remains necessary to widen the focus of this approach in order 
to understand the importance of realization for a Marxist analysis of 
the role of the state.
For our purposes here two types of harrier to realization can 
be distinguished
(1) the barrier to realization resuling from the NATURE
of the good, and
(2) the barrier to realization resulting from the contradictions
(a) between production for exchange value rather than use 
value
(b) between social production and private appropriation
whereby the development of the forces of production 
and reproduction are inhibited not by the technical 
possibilities of production or the nature of the
good so produced, but solely by obstacles to realization#
With regard to (1), we can follow Castells (1975) in recognizing 
that collective consumption is characterized (in terms of liberal 
economics) by the fact that "they do not meet the price of the 
market", that is, they are not governed directly by supply and demand. 
He recognizes that this characteristic does not depend on the way in 
which the good is produced
" ••• but on the type of capital invested that 
is determined in the last instance by the relation 
between the rate of profit of the productive arm 
and the average rate of profit in each branch." 
(Castells,1975,P*178).
However, Castells does not make it clear what he means by this, but 
implicit within his contention can be found the basis of the 
alternative Marxist analysis of the relationship between the state 
and the accumulation process proposed here.
It is suggested here that the type of capital invested is only a 
consequence and NOT itself the cause or distinguishing characteristic 
of the phenomenon. Rather the distinguishing characteristic is to 
be found
"... in the nature of the services some are 
collective or semi-collective goods which it pays no 
individual capitalist to supply since the benefits 
will be derived by his competitors (e.g. industrial 
training) " (Gough, 1975, P*74*)
Offe (1975) makes a similar point in his use of the concept of 
"externalities.” The liberal view of externalities define the concept 
in terms of social costs, but Offe defines externalities in terms of 
USE; that is, the technical nature of certain goods involve 
externalities when they prohibit the buyer from having exclusive 
use value of the good. This is one reason why there is a lack of 
market demand for such goods and the reason why it does not generate 
a market price, and both being one of the bases of non-profitability
explain why such goods are not produced by individual capital.
Other barriers to its provision by private capital include the
scale of capital required to finance their provision and / or the
need for long-term debt financing; either the low profit margins
or the long-term nature of return on capital thus advanced; and the
higher returns on capital to be achieved in other sectors by mobile
(2^capital operating within a competitive environment. ' 1
However, as will become evident, the use of such an orthodox 
analysis, although a necessary complement to the Marxist approach, 
cannot be regarded as a complete alternative to it and it remains 
necessary to further elucidate the Marxist analysis of the role of the 
state with regard to capital accumulation and realization*
The second of the barriers to realization is the result of 
capitalism*s production for exchange value rather than use value. With 
commodity production and the use of money the separation of sale from 
purchase can take place and therefore give rise to realization crises.
"Crisis results from the impossibility to sell*
The difficulty of transforming the commodity ••••
into •••• money ... lies in the fact that ••••
the person who has effected a sale •••• is not
compelled to buy again at once."
(Marx, Theories of Surplus Value II, p.509» 
quoted in Howard and King, 1975)*
(2) Only a few examples have been given here since this aspect 
of the topic has been dealt with extensively by orthodox 
economics and the examples given here need only be sufficient 
to demonstrate the point*
44.
Crises are thus characterized by Marx as periods of "overproduction", 
that is, too much is produced in relation to effective demand; thus every 
crisis is a "realization" crisis "in that there is a failure to 
realize the full value and, therefore, the full surplus value of 
commodities in the form of money*
The role of the state in stimulating aggregate demand at the 
macro level has assumed an increasing importance since the 1930*s, 
and it has been argued that the contemporary importance of cities 
now lies in their consumption function rather than in their production 
function. This growing body of Marxist opinion believe the reasons 
for this shift are to be found in the crisis of the 1930*s. The 
question which this period posed, as Keynes showed, was not how to 
organize the production of value efficiently, but how to circulate the 
value produced (i.e. clear any blockages in the market) and realize 
it through the consumption process (i.e. generates an effective 
demand)•
To talk of the "consumption function" can, however, be misleading 
because the word "consumption" seems merely to relate to demand for, 
and use of, goods and services. However, it seems clear that, in 
Marxian analysis, there are two aspects to the concept - the demand/ 
use aspect and the production/reproduction aspect - and an appreciation 
of this point is crucial to an understanding of the Marxist analysis of 
the role of the city and of the state for capital accumulation*
The theme of "circulation" has been a recurring one throughout 
this work. Its role in the capital accumulation process has been stressed, 
but we are now better placed to fully understand its crucial importance*
The circulation process has many aspects (e.g. the circulation of
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commodities, of means of production, of labour power etc.) but, at 
root, circulation refers to the TOTALITY of exchange necessary for 
continued capital accumulation - that is, production AND reproduction*
The contradictions arising from capitalist production for 
exchange value have been dealt with above* However, the use of 
certain elements of liberal, orthodox theory in the analysis of 
collective consumption, although a necessary complement to the Marxist 
approach, is not a satisfactory alternative to it* The limitations 
of orthodox analysis as a complete explanatory paradigm in its own 
right have been documented by Allan (1979)* Although the genisis 
of state intervention in the provision of public goods and collective 
consumption can be analysed by using certain aspects of orthodox 
analysis, such theories fail to take into consideration the wider 
context within which the state undertakes such provision* Orthodox 
analysis can thus explain why such goods and services are provided by 
the state and not by private capital, but such theories (e.g. public 
interest theories and public choice theories) cannot adequately account 
for the level of provision for their assumption that such goods .. 
and services are ’’equally provided to all in response to demand”
(Allan, 1979»p.ll) fails to explain spatial inequalities in their 
provision and fails to take into account the importance of differential 
access to the political system* They also fail to explain the 
importance of such goods and services provided by the state for the 
wider social and economic system and the requirements and constraints 
the wider system imposes on their provision* Marxist approaches, in 
analyzing the interrelationship between all aspects of the social 
formation, attempt to overcome the limitations inherent in the narrow 
focus of orthodox theory*
It has been argued above that, first and foremost, cities 
(or urban systems) must be analyzed as the main physical and spatial 
setting in which production, distribution and the accumulation of 
capital can take place. Cities mobilize the economy*s basic 
ingredients: they are the places in which basic infrastructural
investments (public and private) are located, and in which an organized 
labour force is concentrated. Also, as will become evident below, 
cities can be viewed as a social and political device for creating 
the cohesive, ordered environment necessary for combining capital and 
labour effectively. Many urban institutions specifically have such an 
economic or reproductive function. However, this relationship 
between the economy and urban institutions should not be construed as 
one of simple determinism for, although the economy itself could not 
function without an adequate and cohesive set of political institutions 
to concentrate, mobilize and order human and physical capital, power 
itself is not merely a fixed or abstract entity to be distributed or 
redistributed but a variable whose presence or absence, whose scale, 
whose limitations and whose determination must be subjected to critical 
analysis before its relationship to economic development can be under­
stood. The questions to be examined, then, are
(a) what are the functions the state undertakes in
order to aid capital accumulation? j
(b) why does the state find itself compelled to undertake
such functions? ; and
(c) what consequences result from the fulfilling of these 
functions by the state?
CHAPTER 5: CAPITAL ACCUMULATION. STATE EXPENDITURE AND THE LOCAL STATE.
5.1 Introduction:
It has been argued above that urbanization and the structure 
and functioning of cities are rooted in the production, reproduction, 
circulation and oveid.1 organization of the capitalist accumulation 
process which requires
(1) fixed investment of part of the surplus product in
new means of production;
(2) production and distribution of articles of consumption
to sustain and reproduce the labour force;
(3) stimulation of an effective demand for the surplus product
produced. (Hill,1977)
Thus, the capitalist city can be viewed not only as a production 
site, but also as a locale for the reproduction process and the 
realization of profit.
It has been shown that state intervention is necessary to mediate 
those contradictions inherent within the capitalist model of production 
which pose barriers to sustained capital accumulation. In applying 
this perspective to the urban level Castells (1975) argues that the 
"urban political" refers to state intervention on the urban economic 
system to preserve the cohesion of the system in its totality - 
that is, both social and spatial cohesion - and that the local state is
one important instrument fulfilling the economic, political and
ideological functions necessary to maintain such cohesion. This 
point has also been made by other authors,
"The most direct form of state regulation of the 
industrial economy is through the public provision 
of social services and economic infrastructure.
The increase in urban employment in collective 
services and in public expenditure on them is a 
familiar and general trend ... The growth in 
services is particularly rapid in those that 
adjust and organize population and enterprises in 
terms of the spatial and economic complexity of 
the metropolitan area ....
Herein lies the oft-noted contradiction in 
contemporary urban development, that 
metropolitan organization and sophisticated 
production technology require substantial invest­
ments in urban infrastructure and in social 
services; but such large-scale investment are 
rarely directly or immediately beneficial to 
private enterprise and are either of low profit­
ability or are non-profitable. Private enteiv* 
prise is reluctant to make such investments or 
to contribute to them, leaving to the state the 
responsibility of managing and limiting /
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collective expenditures in such a way that 
individual capital is benefited and the subordinate 
classes are reconciled to the existing order*" 
(Roberts,1979»P«4)
5*2 State expenditure: a classification
This two-sided aspect to state intervention within the urban 
system - that is, the provision of facilities and services necessary 
to aid capitalist accumulation and the undertaking of measures to 
appease social protest - has been stressed by most Marxist authors* 
Castells and Lojkine have both made this point, as have Poulantzas 
(l975*esp* p.166 and p*124) and Preteceille (1976). Indeed, O'Connor 
(1973) classifies state expenditure on this basis* He views state 
expenditures as having a dual character corresponding to these two 
basic and, it is claimed, frequently contradictory functions of the state 
in a capitalist society. On the one hand, SOCIAL CAPITAL OUTLAYS 
are those state expenditures required for capital accumulation and 
are indirectly productive of private profit* There are two kinds of 
social capital
(1) social investment (social constant capital) which consist 
of projects and services that increase labour productivity 
and the rate of profit; and
(2) social consumption expenditures (social variable capital) 
consisting of projects and services that lower the 
reproduction costs of labour and, other things being equal, 
also increase the rate of profit*
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On the other hand, SOCIAL EXPENSES, (^Connor^ second category of 
state expenditures, consists of projects and services which are 
required to maintain social order and which are not productive of 
capital accumulation.
The local state is one arm of government undertaking such 
functions. The local state acts to sustain capital accumulation through 
the provision of necessary infrastructure (e.g. roads, public 
transport, urban renewal, public housing, sewage,etc.), through 
aiding the spatial reorganization of capital (e.g. planning, control 
of land use, urban-renewal etc.), through investment in "human capital" 
(e.g. provision of educational and cultural facilities, public 
housing etc.), and through stimulating demand by means of public works 
contracts. It also provides necessary facilities for consumption in 
the public sector (e.g. public sector housing, and cultural facilities 
again etc.).
It is apparent that there is an overlap between the services 
and facilities provided and the functions they perform. 0*Connor 
notes the problem of attempting to classify such expenditures since 
"nearly every state expenditure is part social investment, part social 
consumption, and part social expense." One therefore cannot always 
allocate any particular expenditure unambiguously to one category.
Water or transport services are thus a means of production when used 
by industry, but consumption goods when utilized by households.
Housing can be seen as an infrastructural investment, an element in 
the reproduction of labour and as a consumption element. Welfare 
services are elements of variable capital when consumed by the productive
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workforce, but luxuries when consumed by the elderly or other unpro­
ductive groups* O'Connor justifies his attempt at classification by 
contending that in each case a "preponderant set of social forces" 
determines the size and nature of that particular intervention, 
although Gough (1975) argues that the basis will be discovered not 
by analysing the forces instrumental in setting up the facility, 
service etc*, but by a material input - output analysis of their 
predominant use-value*
5*5 Orthodox analysis: an initial critique
It is not sufficient merely to analyze state provisions and 
expenditures simply in terms of their functions - we must also 
analyze why the state finds itself compelled to undertake such 
functions and what are the determinants on their provision*
It is argued here that in discussing state institutions (e*g* 
the operation of the local state and of bureaucrats both of which are 
important elements in the study of urban development in particular 
and the process of capital accumulation in general) we must relate 
their activities to a broader consideration of economic, political 
and social relationships as a whole* Pahl (1975*Chapter 10; and 1977) 
and the urban managerialist school fail to do the latter* In holding 
the view that the local state had to be related to the activities of 
the various managers of the urban system and that urban sociology was 
to be concerned with the allocation by these managers of "urban" 
resources (housing, transport, amenities etc*) , the analysis suffered 
from several weaknesses*
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(1) the approach was essentially descriptive rather than
theoretical and failed to make clear how managers were 
to be defined and how their relative power was to be 
assessed;
(2) the constraints on resource allocation were under- 
emphasized; in particular, the fact that the resources 
allocated were SCARCE resources was taken for granted — 
almost as a naturally occurring phenomenon - whereas in 
fact this scarcity depends on a particular set of social, 
political and economic arrangements in society as a 
whole as well as on factors which relate more directly to 
the urban situation.
To a certain extent Pahl later in reformulation of his analysis
(1975, Chapter 13 and 1977) overcame some of these weaknesses.
Although he continued to maintain that it is useful to study the values
and objectives of those who allocate resources, he attempted to ground
this analysis in a specific theory of the state. "Managers" were
defined as state officials at the local level performing a crucial
mediating role between the central state and the local population,
and between the state and private capital; they allocated resources,
(1}but their control over the production and realization ' ' of such 
resources was strictly limited. Although Pahl identified the ecological 
system, the market and central government as three key limitations on 
the autonomy of local managers, his theory still overemphasized the 
autonomy of the state in its relation to private capital and this
(1) Pahl also fails to discuss the constraints regarding distribution; 
see chapters following.
fails to provide an analysis whereby the necessary role of the state 
in securing the conditions of capital accumulation can be understood*
Certain aspects of the pluralists* analysis of urban politics 
can also be criticised on similar grounds. Castells (1977»PP*64-5) 
has shown that, in concentrating on the actions of individuals, by 
adopting a social psychological approach to power, by their focus on 
an analysis of a "network of strategies among ACTORS, each one of 
whom is defined by his attempt to maximize his power and gains", and 
by remaining at the community level such studies neglect the deter­
mination of local "urban" issues by general social structures and 
forces.
5*4 Conclusion
It is therefore obvious that the local state (and other aspects 
of the urban political system ' y) cannot be fully understood by an 
analysis which simply focus on its INTERNAL dynamics and/or adopt 
some sort of "methodological individualism" approach. External 
influences have to be taken into account and, although it has been 
argued throughout this work that the most important external deter­
minants of local state action are a product of the capitalist made of 
production and the capital accumulation process, schools of thought 
other than the Marxist, even though they reflect the importance of 
the economic sphere, do merit critical attention#
(2) Unless stated otherwise, the term "local state" will henceforth 
be used to refer to all state instruments functioning specifically 
at the local level.
The most important of these alternative schools of thought are 
the pluralists and, although we have already dealt with one certain 
.aspect of Marxist criticism of this body of literature, a fuller 
critical analysis is required both because of the important impact 
pluralist tenets have had for the analysis of local political 
systems and because contained within the critique of such work can 
be found the basis of a more satisfactory analysis#
CHAPTER 6: THE PLURALIST SCHOOL: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF AN ALTERNATIVE
MODEL OF LOCAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS.
6.1. Introduction.
As a critique of the power elite 
theorists, much of the Pluralist literature is important and 
valid. However, the alternative model of community power 
relations posited by the pluralists are themselves open to 
criticism, criticism v;hich is so fundamental that it necessitates 
a complete reorientation in our approach to the study of 
community power relations.
. Pluralism: the basic tenets.
The five major components of pluralist theory seem
to be the result of a mixture of a priori methodological 
assumptions and empirical evidence and can be summarized as 
follows.
(1) There are no# power elites; power is widely dispersed 
and distributed in communities. According to Polsby 
(1963), Pluralists
"see American society as fractured into a 
congeries of hundreds of small special interest 
groups, with incompletely overlapping memberships, 
widely different power bases, and a multitude of 
techniques for exercising influence oh decisions 
salient to them..." (p.118)
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and this is stated to be true at both the national and the 
local (community) level. However, in stating this the 
Pluralists do not deny the existence of community elites.
As Dahl states,
"In any durable association of more than a handful 
of individuals, typically a relatively small 
proportion of the people exercise a relatively 
great influence over all the important choices 
being on the life of the association - its 
survival, for example, or its share in such 
community resources as wealth, power, and esteem, 
or the way these resources are shared within the 
association, or changes in the structure, 
activities, and dominant goals of the association, 
and so on. These persons are, by definition, its 
leaders." (Dahl, 1961, p.95.)
What, however, Pluralists DO deny is that the areas 
' in which the power of these different elites is effective are
t
the same, or that there is much overlap between them. As Dahl 
puts it, elite power is "non-cumulative" (p.169 ff.) - thus, 
there may be elites, but there is no elite.
(2) Any theory of community power must be testable by;
empirical evidence. This follows from the Pluralist belief U
' b
that power is always directly applied and observable.
(3) Partly following from (2) above it is contended
by Pluralists that community power should be investigated with 
case studies pf "important decisions". Otherwise, how can 
one tell whether or not someone (or group) has power unless 
some sequence of observed events prove such - "potential" 
power, they would contend, cannot be discussed in a scientific
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manner. Thus, we should study power IN PROCESS, that is as 
it is actually applied towards the achievement of a certain 
result. Pluralists justify the case-study approach by 
insisting that the decisions they examine are "important'' ones* 
For Dahl one of the criterion of importanfce is that the issue 
should involve actual disagreements and preferences among two 
or more groups. (See below for Polsby's criteria.)
(4) Only GOVERNMENTAL decisions, that is those made
by formal political bodies or persons, should be studied. This
is because of the fact that, if one-is primarily concerned with
local political power and those decisions effecting large 
sections of the population or local communities (one of 
Polsby's criteria of importance), then
" .... the political arena is the sector of community
life in which large groups in the community make
demands upon one another and collectively determine 
policy outcomes."
(5) The power system is "slack", allowing for social
change within it. That is, if power is widely dispersed and
if resources are now always used to exert power then the system 
of power is fluid because there will arise "power vacuums". 
Also, where power is non-cumulative, there is always an "issue 
area" which can be adopted by outside groups.
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Plurailism; a critique.
Criticism of the Pluralist literature has come from 
many quarters and is wide-ranging in its focus, and this 
heterogeneity must be seen in the light of the nature of the 
Pluralist literature itself. For example, Dahl's work, 
although it can be seen as an empirical theory or as a working 
model of political decision making, also contains normative
i
or prescriptive elements, and Polsby seems to treat Pluralism 
jboth as a type of political system and as a method to be used 
by sociologists to investigate political systems. Thus the 
term "Pluralism" is not just a label which is attached to a 
political system which, after full empirical investigation has 
been found to contain not one centre of power but many, but is 
also something much more. The term "pluralism" as used by
i
Dahl; Polsby, etc., is in fact-inextricably linked to their
i
a priori conception of what constitutes a democracy. Thus,
j
criticism of the Pluralist literature can be divided into two 
categories; those which, although utilising the pluralism's 
own methodological tools and premisses criticize them for 
failing to prove that the type of political systems which they 
designate as pluralist fully embody certain of the 
characteristics necessary to also designate those systems as 
"democratic", and those which contend that the pluralists have 
failed for methodological reasons to adequately explain the 
decision making process within the political systems analysed 
and the power relations embodied within them.
The articles by Newton (1969) and by Sharpe (1973) 
fall into the former category. Although both validly criticised 
the equating of "pluralist systems of decision making" with the 
more normative conception of democracy, they nevertheless do 
not fully actdress themselves to the question of whether the 
pluralists actual analysis of the decision making processes 
________ within thp communities studied fully and adequately capture
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the nature of the political system and its underlying power
relations, or whether ANY analysis which utilizes the type
of assumptions and methodology used by the pluralists actually 
ever could. For these reasons it is the intention of this 
author to turn immediately to what is thought to be the more 
pertinent and useful criticisms mainly, those which can be 
subsumed in the second category.
Bachrach and Baratz in their article "Two Faces
of Power" (in McCoy and Playford, 1967.) contend th3t the
difference in findings between the pluralist.school and the 
elitist school are the product of the fundamental differences
in both the underlying assumptions and research methodology.
\
On the whole Bachrach and Baratz believe that the pluralists 
criticisms of the elitists are valid, but they contend that the 
pluralists themselves have failed to grasp the whole truth of 
the matter because they fail to see that there are TWO, not 
one, faces of power.
As we have seen Pluralists concentrate their 
attention, not upon the sources of power, but on its exercise - 
they are thus uninterested in the "reputedly powerful".
However, according to Bachrach and Baratz, there are two 
fundamental defects of this approach.
1. The model provides no OBJECTIVE criteria for 
distinguishing between "important" and "unimportant" 
issues arising in the political arena (pp.148-149).
2. The model takes no account of the fact that 
power may be, and often is, "exercised by confining 
the scope of decision making to relatively 'safe' 
issues." A concept of power, 3achrach and Baratz 
contend, cannot be predicated solely on the 
assumption that power is totally embodied and fully
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reflected in "concrete decisions". They state 
that,
"Of course power is exercised when A 
participates in the making of decisions 
that affect 3. But power is also exercised 
when A devotes his energies to creating or 
reinforcing social and political values 
and institutional practices that limit the 
scope of the political process to public 
consideration of only those issues which are 
comparatively innocuous to A." (p.149)
Thus they wouid agree with the contention of 
Schattschneider that
"All forms of political organisation have a 
bias in favour of the exploitation of some 
kinds of conflict and the suppression of 
others because ORGANIZATION IS THE 
MOBILIZATION OF BIAS. Some issues are 
organised into politics while others are 
organised out." (Bachrach and Baratz, p.150)
The suggestion then is that the decisional approach 
of the Pluralists was inadequate because it had 
failed by its very methodology to identify and 
describe "non decisions". These "non decisions" occur 
when issues are prevented for various reasons from 
ever reaching the "agenda" of a community and it 
follows then that a study of "decisions" will not 
identify matters upon which there has never been 
any decisions.
Both Parry and Morriss (1974) and Lukes (1975) 
agree with Bachrach and Baratz about the Pluralists failure
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to take non-decisions into account but both t3ke issue with 
Bachrach and Baratz use of the term "non-decision" and with 
their stress on the importance of "conflict" in decision' 
making.
For Lukes, although Bachrach and Baratz critique 
is partly ANTI-BEHAVIOURAL in that they emphasize the 
importance of confining the scope of decision making to 
"safe" issues, they still insist that their so-called non­
decisions which confine the scope of decision making are 
themselves (observable) DECISIONS (whether overt or covert, 
unconscious or conscious) .
Lukes contends that Bachrach and Baratz position 
on this issue is inadequate because it is still too committed 
to behaviouralism and thus fails to realise that
"the bias of the system is not sustained simply by 
a series of individually chosen acts, but also, 
most importantly, by the socially structured and 
culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and 
practices of institutions, which may indeed be 
manifested by individuals' inaction." (Lukes, 1975, 
p.22-23)
This was a similar point to the one made by Parry and Morriss 
regarding the cumulative effect of lesser decisions and social 
routines, that is, that the bias of a system can be mobilized 
in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended 
result of particular individual's choices. Rather, it can 
be seen as a function of collective forces and social 
arrangements which although they are made up of individuals 
the power they exercise cannot simply be Explained in terms 
of individuals decisions or behaviour. Parry and Morriss 
thus believe that the difficulties of the original account
of non-decisions can be overcome if one appreciates that A 
can often gain advantages and B become disadvantaged by the 
performance of "social routines" which go largely unquestioned, 
for
"In this way"A " acquires "consequential power" although 
he may not have brought the routine into being and 
although he may be in no direct causal relationship 
with "B. (Parry and Morriss, 1974, p.319)
To back up this claim, Parry and Morriss contend
that the emphasis on conflict and its resolution through decisive 
action is only one way of looking at politics. Politics, they 
claim, is also "ruling" and "ruling", although implying conflict 
resolution, to a greater extent also implies "regulation". To a 
great extent "ruling" is the PERFORMANCE OF ROUTINES and therefor 
much of what is termed "politics" is
"... the application of fairly standard procedures to
the current problem rather than the settlement of
"world historical" conflicts" (Parry and Morriss, 1974, 
p.321)
thus, government routinely works within the prevailing mode of 
economic production and exchange, and as such politics can be 
described as ATTENDING to the arrangements of a community rather 
than as MAKING the arrangements. . The significance of this is 
that any study of power which limits itself to study of decision 
making isolates itself from the. wider cultural, ideological and 
economic context and as such is inadequate. Power is often best 
indicated by the routine, unquestioned and unspectacular 
activites of governments and of economic leaders and, as such, 
the implication is that "the routinely powerful is the truly 
powerful" (p.322).
Lukes also criticizes Bachrach and Baratz over their 
association of power with actual, observable conflict but, unlike
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Parry and Morriss, goes on to place more emphasis on the 
importance of the appreciation of cultural or ideological factor 
rather than systemic or structural factors. Thus Lukes goes on 
to contend that certain types of power e.g. "manipulation" and 
"authority" may not involve such conflict. Also, pov/er may be 
exercised by shaping or determining people* s actual wants 
through the control of information, the mass media, and through 
the process of socialization - indeed Lukes cites Dahl as 
alluding to the occurence of just this phenomenon in "Who 
Governs" (see page 164 and page 317). Also, Bachrach and 
Baratz belief that non-decision making only exists where there 
are GREIVANCES which are denied entry into the political process 
rules out, according to Lukes, the possibility of false or 
manipulated consciousness.
This criticism, although valid, does riot get us any 
nearer an understanding of the political process at either the 
local or the national level, for to point out that ideological 
or cultural factors have the effect of limiting the nature and 
scope of decision making within a political system, by itself 
does not tell us why this should be so. To draw a correlation 
between ideology, cultural factors, false consciousness, etc., 
and the beneficial effectd such factors may have for the 
maintenance of an on-going system, does not explain the origin 
of such factors, why they take the form they do, or why they 
should exist at all. Far less does it tell us anything about 
the political system itself or why it takes the form it does.
To overcome these difficulties it is necessary to
approach the problem from the criticisms made by Parry and
Morriss of Bachrach and Baratz concepts of "non-decisions" and 
"mobilization of bias". As we have seen, for Bachrach and 
Baratz non-decisions are ACTS which help support the
mobilization of bias which inatum gives legitimacy to the non­
decisions. Mobilization of bias is a set of predominant "rules
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of the gome" which, going largely unquestioned, systematically 
and consistently benefits some group of persons at the expense 
of others.
Where Parry and Morriss take issue with Bachrach 
and Baratz, however, is not over whether there is such a thing 
as a non-decision, but over Bachrach and Baratz definition of 
it. Parry and Morriss contend that Bachrach and Baratz 
definition of a non-decision is so wide 39k general that it could 
include almost any possible alternative to the decisions 
actually taken or the social and economic relationship already 
existing. Thus, Parry and Morriss contend, what is lacking 
from Bachrach and Baratz description is the ability to construct 
criteria of significance for distinguishing between a range 
of POSSIBLE alternatives (p.324), and this is a criticism 
which can also be raised against Lukes.
To overcome this difficulty (and others implied 
in non-decisional approaches) Parry and Morriss argue that in 
many cases non-decisions ARE decisions (they cite certain of 
Bachrach and Baratz examples of a "non-decision" as proof) but 
that we also have to distinguish between such "non-decisions" 
and other factors such as "social routines" and "false 
consciousness" which prevent certain issues, especially 
"non-safe" issues from arising for
"Some non-decisions appear to involve conscious 
choices, others to be the outcome of the unconscious 
acceptance of community values. Still others 
are identifiable only by their social and 
political consequences. To understand the 
power and the penetrability of any community 
it is better to replace blanket terms like 
"non-decision" with a more precise analysis 
of the many different patterns decision 
making can take." (p.325)
Thus, Parry and M->rriss would argue, there will be cases 
of non-decision making which ARE decisions, but these will 
not necessarily be "key" decisions. Rather, they might jus 
as well be the products of a series of LESSER decisions or 
choices each of which forecloses other courses of action 
and commits the actor or others to directions they might not 
otherwise have taken. Also, many of these lesser decisions 
may be component parts of a routine and as such decision 
making often takes on a "disjointed incrementalism" style. 
Thus, a decision maker will only make marginal adjustments 
to policy, operating within a framework of reference which i 
not of his own making but which is largely composed of 
precedents, comparable decisions and by the minor amendments 
most claimants press for.
Conclusions
The weakenesses of the pluralist approach to the analysis of 
local political systems are thus obvious and, as they have been 
outlined in both this, and the previous, chapter, it would be pedantic 
to reiterate them here. However, as indicated in the previous chapter, 
certain of the criticisms laid against the pluralists contain the 
basis of an alternative (Marxist) analysis of the local state, its 
functions, and the determinants on them and it is to a critical 
assessment of this approach that we now turn.
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CHAPTER 7: MARXIST ANALYSIS AND THE STATE.
7.1 Introduction
It is clear that in order to understand the nature of the 
state within a capitalist system it is necessary to reject the 
conventional wisdom of political science and sociology - what 
Poulantzas describes as the "problematic of the subject" - which 
treats actors as the fundamental units of analysis and explains power 
in terms of their goals, alliances and actions. In contrast, Marxist 
analysis argues that social practices are determined by economic, 
political and ideological structures within a social formation.
However, as will become evident, certain aspects of Marxist 
analysis are problematic and, as will be demonstrated below, much of 
this is due to the fact that the Marxist literature on the state has 
tended to focus around the Miliband - Poulantzas debate (see Blackburn, 
1972), i.e. between the "instrumentalist" and the "structuralist" 
approach, and this has rather tended to limit the nature of much of the 
subsequent analysis.
7.2 The Miliband-Poulantzas debate.
Both Miliband (1969) and Poulantzas (1975) focus on the political 
as an autonomous object of analysis although this emphasis is not 
absolute but relative. Thus, it is not here implied that either Miliband 
or Poulantzas deny that political forms must be related to "the anatomy 
of civil society; what does seem to be the case, however, is that 
both tend to concentrate on analysing the internal dynamics of each
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and., as a result, neglect the important factor of the RELATIONSHIP 
between the two.
There are of course differences between the two authors. Miliband 
mainly concerns himself with an EMPIRICAL critique of orthodox 
political and sociological thought. However, there are obvious 
limitations to this approach for, by not initially founding his critique 
in a more systematic analysis of capitalist society, Miliband is unable 
to go on to develop an alternative analysis of the state which would 
show the RELATIONSHIP between its development and the development of 
the capitalist mode of production.
Poulantzas validly criticizes Miliband for failing to appreciate 
the STRUCTURAL links between the bourgeoisie and the capitalist state. 
For Poulantzas.
"the relation between the bourgeois class and 
the State is an OBJECTIVE relation. This 
means that if the FUNCTION of the State in a 
determinate social formation and the 
INTERESTS of the dominant class coincide, it is 
by reason of the system itself: the direct
participation of members of the ruling class 
in the State apparatus is not the CAUSE but 
the EFFECT, and moreover a chance and 
contingent one, of this objective coincidence.
(in BLACKBURN, 1972.)
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That is, what makes the state in capitalist society a capitalist
state is not the class composition of the personnel of the state
apparatus but the position occupied by the state in the capitalist
(1)
mode of production* ' '
Poulantzas* analysis of the state, although an advance on 
both Miliband and the pluralists, has also been criticised*
Poulantzas distinguishes between "the political" (le politique) which 
is the instance of a social formation (e.g* the state) and "politics"
(la politique) which he defines as the struggle (between classes) 
for the control of the institutions which form the political instance*
For Poulantzas, the state*s role is basically political and its main 
functions are
(1) to ensure the cohesion of the instances of the social 
formation, and
(2) to reproduce its class structure (1975a,p*24)
Although the state apparatus can take on the role of a 
"relatively autonomous social force" (1975a*P*23) it cannot be regarded 
as having its own "will" or "power", or as being able to impose its 
own policies; that is, institutions as such have no power - rather, 
they are "centres of power" in which class power is exercised and are 
thus important in an analysis of power only in so far as they enable 
a social class to realize its specific objective interests* Thus, 
terms such as "community power", "local power" or "urban power" would 
be unacceptable to Poulantzas since they imply that it is institutions 
rather than classes from which power derives* The state, according to
(l) See also Offe, 1974* PP*52-53*
Puulantzas is "not an entity as such" (1975* P»26), hut REFLECTS CLASS 
RELATIONS (condensate). The state is not viewed as being potentially 
independent of dominant class interests, or as being completely 
subservient to them because the state is not external to and separate 
from the class structure.
"Relative autonomy of the state is not understood 
as being the capacity to oppose or arbitrate 
between different capitalist interests •••• the 
image of "neutrality" is deceptive because 
the state is a necessary product of, and intrinsic 
to, capitalist production relations." (Flynn,1978,p.6)
7*5 The structuralist approach; initial criticisms
This tendency by Poulantzas to identify class struggle with 
the realm of the political and his separation of the political from 
the economic has been the subject of criticism. Holloway and 
Picciotto (1978) contend that, because Poulantzas views radical 
revolutionary demands by groups in society as being mainly articulated 
within the political system and because their success or failure is 
seen as being dependent upon the nature (functional) and responses of 
that system, the origins, nature, strength, success, failure and 
overall effects of such demands are not put properly into their 
systemic context. By separating the political from the economic 
Poulantzas is also prone to analyze the LIMITS imposed on state 
action without reference to the structural relationship of the process
of capitalist accumulation and to thus see the limits to state 
action as arising not from the logic of capital but from the form 
of class struggle*
Nevertheless, Poulantzas1s work has greatly influenced Marxist 
analysis* Miliband himself has come to accept most of the criticisms 
and the alternative approach proposed by Poulantzas. Lojkine,
/Castells and Preteccille all follow Poulantzas in viewing the state 
as "internal" to (the "condensed; reflection" of) the class struggle, 
and therefore responsive, to working class pressure as well as to 
the"needs" of capital accumulation, although both Lojkine and 
Preteccille appear to admit that not all intervention are obviously 
reducible to simple class interests and both would be prepared to 
acknowledge the significance of fragmentation within, and inconsistency 
between, the structure and operation of the state apparatus.
Glynn and Sutcliffe (1972) in portraying the state as an 
instrument of the capitalist class in its fight against working class 
militancy follow Miliband in concentrating on an empirical demon­
stration of how the state has acted in the interests of capital while, 
at the same time, either neglecting or explaining simply by reference 
to "the class struggle", the problem of what makes the state take 
such action. Gough*s analysis (1975)* in making a similar distinction 
between economics and politics, suffers from the same weakness. Both 
also ignore the importance of the limitations on state action and the 
contradictory effects such state actions can generate*
Lojkine, although basically accepting Poulantzas's views, 
nevertheless tends to oscillate between a structuralist and an
instrumentalist perspective. The ambivelance is best demonstrated 
with regard to his concept of "relative autonomy" whereby political 
concessions to working class pressure and other non-class specific, 
state policies are described in terms of instrumentalist conspiracy 
theory - that is, such policies are interpreted as being either pre­
emptive or delaying tactics by the state, somehow anticipating and
avoiding future conflict, and thereby ensuring the long-term survival
(2)of capitalist relations*v J
While there are differences in detail and in emphasis even 
between those Marxist theories of the state which base their analysis 
on a similar paradigm,they have certain characteristics in common. 
Although the specific example of Lojkine was referred to above, all 
of the Marxist writers mentioned above do, at different points in 
their respective arguments, seem ambiguous about explaining state 
action as a response to alter systemic requirements or class manipulation 
and thus equivocate between "structural" or "instrumental" views of 
the state. This approach has righly been criticised; by Gold, Lo 
and Wright who state that
"... it is impossible to see how the complex 
apparatus of the state can be understood 
adequately in a model which sees policy outcomes 
primarily in terms of class conscious manipulations 
by the ruling class. But the structuralist perspective 
is also inadequate. For while it does situate the 
formation of policy in the context of the functioning/
(2) see FLYNN,1978, on this point and also on the different
concepts of "relation autonomy" used by other Marxist 
writers, e.g. Castells.
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of the capitalist system as a whole, it 
generally does not explain the SOCIAL MECHANISMS 
which actually generate a class policy that is 
compatible with the needs of the system..."
(quoted in Flynn,1979).
Thus, the fundamental point to be made is that by adopting 
this structuralist line of approach without properly analyzing the 
RELATION between the capitalist state and its basis (and the on- 
going-changes within that basis) all one is able to do is to point 
to the capitalist CONTENT of state action without being able to 
explain WHY the content should be as it is. All that such approaches 
do is to state that the state (local or national) ACTS (or functions) 
in the "long-term interests of capitalist accumulation without 
explaining why this should be so*
Saunders, in his analysis of the local state in Croydon(l978 
and 1979)* in attempting to refine the work of Rulantzas, Lojkine,
Preteceille etc. by making the distinction between the "productive" 
and the "allocative" functions of the local state falls into the 
same trap. He makes an analytical distinction between two key 
functions performed by the local states
(i) the allocation of collective consumption
(ii) the provision of productive infrastructure.
He tells us that the allocative function (e.g. the provision
of housing, education, social services etc.) is to be analyzed in 
terms of the political demands of groups within a community
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’’the allocative function is strongly influenced 
by external political pressures such that 
working-class mobilization may be able to 
force certain concessions •***."(1979>P*15)
while the productive function (roads, car parks, the use of planning 
to aid capital reorganisation - which functions in the interests of 
capital accumulation)- is to be analyzed by using a MANAGEEALIST 
perspective
"the productive function is exercised independently 
of outside interests (though not of central 
government) although attempts may be made to 
draw those affected into the decision-making 
process (hence Pahlfs concern with corporatism) 
in order to assess better what needs to be done,.*
In its productive function •••• it will tend 
to develop its own policies, often on apparently 
"technical" criteria, aimed at maintaining a 
profitable private sector*"
(1979, p.16)
However, this tells us nothing* For, if the productive function is 
controlled by managers whose actions are not determined by either 
individual capitalists, fractions of capital, or by the overall 
system of production then why should these managers NECESSARILY act 
in the interests of capitalist accumulation at all? The empirical 
evidence may show us that they do do, but the analysis does not even
tell us WHY they do, far less why it is NECESSARILY the case that 
they should do, Saunders also fails to realise that certain of 
these productive functions ARE the subject of political debate 
and contention (e.g. motorways and motorway groups) and therefore 
it is necessary to consider the inter-relationship between the 
political and the economic in order to explain them. Finally,
Saunders’ analysis of the allocative function of the local state is 
itself open to criticism because it assigns too much importance to the 
political and, as a result, he fails to see that certain of the functions 
he assigns to the allocative sphere are themselves necessary for the 
continued reproduction of the capitalist system (e,g, housing, 
education etc*) and therefore that the level and nature of their 
provision cannot fully be explained by reference to competing political 
demands alone*
7*4 Marxism: an organisational perspective*
It is at this point that we can appreciate the importance of 
some of the criticisms raised against the pluralists. It was 
demonstrated in Chapter 6 that the exercise of confining the scope 
of decision-making to safe issues, the concepts of "non-decisions” and 
"the mobilization of bias" could not be fully explained in terms of 
the actions of individuals or groups. Both Schattschneider and Lukes 
hinted at the truth; the former in stating that ORGANISATION 
(i.e. systemic factors) is the mobilization of bias, and Lukes in 
contending that it is to the socially structured and culturally 
patterned behaviour of groups and institutions that we must look to 
explain the mobilization of bias* More importantly, Parry and Morriss’s
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theory of "consequential power" - which is a function of the 
performance of SOCIAL ROUTINES - also provides us with a useful and 
necessary analytical tool for analyzing the state because it directs 
attention away from the FUNCTIONS of the state and on to an 
examination of the factors influencing the nature of the FORM of the 
state and the decision rules affecting the determination of individual 
policy outputs. It will be argued below that these factors are a 
necessary complement to an analysis which situates the state in the 
overall complex of capitalist society#
Offe (1974 and 1975) attempts to provide a crucial Marxist 
framework with which to analyze both systemic and organizational 
aspects of the capitalist state. In criticizing "influence theories" 
and "constraint theories" for implying the neutrality of the state 
APPARATUS as an instrument which, according to its internal structure, 
could in principle be used to implement other interests, Offe 
contends that they fail to analyze
".... the CLASS-CHARACTER of the State; they 
both restrict themselves to investigating 
external determinants which make the CONTENT of 
the political process class bound."
(Offe, 1974,P.33)
What needs to be investigated, therefore, according to Offe, are 
those "capitalist" policies which arise from the state organisation^ 
own (internal) routines and formal structures (see 1974>P*34 and p*35)»
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"One can only speak of a "capitalist State" 
or an "ideal collective capitalist" only 
when it has been successfully proved that the 
SYSTEM OP POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS DISPLAYS ITS 
OWN CLASS-SPECIFIC SELECTIVITY CORRESPONDING TO 
THE INTERESTS OP THE ACCUMULATION OP CAPITAL."
( Offe, 1974, P.36).
In attempting to do this Offe, in defining the characteristics 
of the capitalist state - or the state in capitalist society - refers 
not solely to its structural attributes but to the way in which it 
is functionally related to and dependent upon the accumulation process. 
To a certain extent he divorces the state from the accumulation 
process - "the state is no capitalist itself, and accumulation takes 
place only in private accumulating units" (1975»P*126.) - although y 
for Offe, the state does have the MANDATE to create and sustain 
the conditions of accumulation. Nevertheless, the state’s power 
relationships and its very decision-making process do DEPEND on the 
presence and continuity of the accumulation process because, in 
meeting its budgetary obligations, it relies extensively on resources 
created in the accumulation process which are derived through taxation. 
A similar point is made by Eiedland et.al.
"Governments in capitalist societies are 
(3)consequently ' 7 dependent on taxes which are 
ultimately drawn from incomes or profits generated /
(3) i.e. because of their exclusion from productive activity^-
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in the private sector* As long as state 
financing is dependent upon taxation (or 
public debt to private financial intermediaries), 
its autonomy is limited by the necessity to 
AVOID policies, which might impringe upon 
capital accumulation* And to the extent that 
capital accumulation and public fiscal capacity 
both depend on continued private control of 
investment, production and location decisions, 
political issues which question that control 
are extraordinarily difficult to raise•"
(1977,p.4540
Thus, for Offe,
"•••• every interest the state (or the personnel 
of the state apparatus, its various branches and 
agencies) may have in their own stability and 
development can only be pursued if it is in 
accordance with the imperative of maintaining 
accumulation; this fundamental dependency upon 
accumulation functions as a selective principle 
upon state policies. The criteria of the 
stability of accumulation is thus incorporated in 
the pursuit of interests and policies that, 
considered by themselves, may have little or 
nothing to do with accumulation*^^ (1975>P« 126)
(4) c.f, Friedland et*al* 1977»P*454* Also, for an application 
of this to the concrete activities of the local stage, 
see KRAUSHAAR, 1979.
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Offe's fourth element in the definition of the capitalist 
state is "legitimation.” To achieve this, according to Offe, the 
state must, at the same time as it pursues policies conduisive to 
capital accumulation, conceal its nature as a capitalist state by 
conveying the image of an organization pursuing common and general 
interests of society as a whole.
Offe then turns to an examination of the decision rules by which 
the state operates. Saunders* (1979) distinction between the "allocation" 
and the "productive" functions of the state was taken from Offe.
However, Offe’s use of the two concepts is somewhat different from 
that of Saunders. For Offe, both the state's allocative and 
productive functions are concerned with maintaining the conditions of 
capitalist accumulation, the distinction being that the allocative 
function is concerned with those resources (e.g. land, taxes) which 
are already under the control of the state (l975*PP»127-'129)whereas 
the productive function is concerned with those (mainly physical) inputs 
necessary to maintain capital accumulation which the state does not own 
but has to CREATE*
Offe believes that different decision rules operate for each of 
these two functions. For Offe
" What characterizes ALLOCATIVE policies, then, 
is that politics and policies are not differentiated:
Policies are congruent with politics ••••• and the 
question of political decision-making that goes on 
internal to the state apparatus is to whom or to 
what purpose these already available resources /
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should be allocated. This question can be 
resolved by the method of power struggle over 
the resources of the state, that is, through 
politics." (Offe, 1975, pp.128-129).
That is, directives as to what use is to be made of these state-owned 
resources can be directly derived from the manifest interests 
and power relationships that become apparent in the process of 
politics and political conflict.
With regard to the productive function, however, the state 
has to devise decision rules of its own for, in reacting to 
disturbances within the system, the demands of the most powerful 
groups may not be conduisive to the maintenance of the accumulation 
process as a whole:
"The rules that govern Politics are not 
sufficient to solve this problem. An 
additional set of decision rules is required 
that determine POLICIES.”
(Offe, 1975.P.135).
Despite the fact that there are certain inadequacies in Offe's 
approach (which will be dealt with below), his analysis does provide 
some useful insights into issues of contemporary importance for an 
analysis of the state in capitalism and, as such, a further 
elaboration of his analysis is not inappropriate at this point.
Regarding state productive policy formation, Offe distinguishes 
between form and content and argues that public policy cannot fully 
be understood by content analysis alone.
"The usual conceptualization of state activity 
visualizes the state as a "problem solver" : 
Problems are recognized, and more or less 
adequate solutions are produced. This image is 
not wrong, but one sided and incomplete. For 
what the state does if its works on a problem, is a 
DUAL process: It organizes certain activities
and measures directed towards the ENVIRONMENT 
and adopts for ITSELF a certain organizational 
proceedure from which the production and 
implementation of policies emerge. Every time 
a state deals with a problem in its environment, 
it deals with a problem of itself, that is , 
its internal mode of operation".
(1975.P.1J5).
Offe believes that both of these aspects of problem-selving are 
interconnected in a circular way:
"Social and economic problems, as items on 
the state agenda, may trigger off changes 
in the formal strategies according to which 
the state operates, and conversely these 
formal strategies may substantially determine /
81.
both the ability of the state to perceive 
problems and the nature of the ensuing policies,"
(1975, p.135) ^
Offe then turns to an examination of how the formal rules of 
policy production determine the activities of the state and analyzes 
potential discrepancies and contradictions between the state*s 
functions and its internal structure (institutionalized mode of 
operation)* The bureaucratic method seems to Offe to both 
theoretically and empirically correlate with the state's allocation 
function
"The reason for this assumption is that in 
ALLOCATIVE activities, in which state-owned 
resources are distributed, the bureaucratic 
mode is both best suited and sufficient to 
administer the allocation process in 
accordance with the functional requirements 
of the capitalist state," (1975>P*136)
However, Offe contends that this method is unsuited to the state's 
productive function because this function gives rise to the question 
of GOALS and the bureaucratic model being " the application of PEE- 
determined rules" is insufficient for the task.
The "purposive action" method (whereby technical rationality 
underpins the mode of operation) is also, according to Offe,limited 
in its ability to set goals and
(5) See KRAUSHAAR, 1979 for the application of this point
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"Only if the goals of purposive rationality 
can be taken for granted in a given situation, 
can purposive rationality become the organizing 
principle of the structure of an organization." 
(1975.P.138)
Whereas private industry (which, according to Offe, employs a 
similar purposive action decision-making process) derives either 
its goals or very strongest criteria for action from its 
environmenta (i.e. the "market" ), the state
".... does not have unequivocal, uncontro- 
versial, and operational cues as to what the 
goals of its productive state activities 
should be; at least it is unable to derive 
such definitions of goals and goal related 
criteria from its environment •••• The 
variety of needs, interests, demands, crises, 
etc. that appear in the environment of state 
activity are of a contradictory nature, 
especially under conditions of advanced
forms of competition   to allow the
derivation of operational goals. Conversely, 
the state in its specific capitalist form is 
unable to impose on its environment its OWN 
definition of a set of goals that it then 
could pursue according to instrumental rationality."
(1975, p.138).
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Offe cites other obstacles to purposive rationality facing the
state
(1) the fact that the state, because it lacks total control 
over its environment (especially the market), cannot 
rely on or ensure stability of external conditions for 
the length of a policy cycle;
(2) the fact that there are externalities to policies, which 
are both difficult, if not impossible, to allow for
and which can come into contradiction with the legitimation 
needs of the state;
and
(3) there is the difficulty of assessing both the value of 
goals and of costing the means, the latter problem being 
exacerbated by fiscal constraints and crisis which are 
themselves aggravated by the number and costs of productive 
state activities (c.f. O'Connor, 1973? Hill, 1977? and 
Friedland et. al. 1977)
Thus, ' for Offe, it is only under certain "very limited and unlikely" 
conditions that the purposive action method could be adopted as 
the organizing principle of productive state activity.
The limitations of allowing the state's productive function to 
be determined by a process of political conflict and consensus are 
obvious. The state would become incapable of long-term planning, the 
demands might not be in accordance with the needs of the system and, 
finally,
"... conflict is created by the fact that 
the adoption of social conflict and consensus as 
the basis for policy production does INVITE more 
demands and interests to articulate themselves 
than can be SATISFIED under the fiscal and 
institutional constraints that the capitalist 
state is unable to escape." (1975»P«140«)
Offe thus concludes that the capitalist state cannot strike 
a balance between its required functions "which result from a 
certain state of the accumulation process, and its dynamics" 
(I975,p.l40) and its internal structure although it can attempt to 
minimize this strueture/function discrepancy. Thus
"What is real about (the capitalist state) 
is the constant attempt to reconcile and 
make compatible these various functions 
with its internal structure, or mode of 
operation." (1975*P»1^4)
Offe's argument does have its weaknesses. Because his link 
between the state and the capitalist accumulation process is somewhat 
tenuous, it could be argued that such an analysis is better able to 
explain the CONSTRAINTS upon state action rather than all aspects of 
its positive outputs. However, even this aspect may be somewhat 
problematic (at least in terms of Offe's argument) « that is, the 
state may have to protect capital accumulation, but does this
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necessarily mean that it must pursue capitallST accumulation? In 
terms of Offe’s argument the fact that the state empirically does 
protect capitalist accumulation has not yet been logically proved 
to be more than _ . contingent, and not a necessary, fact* Perhaps 
this is too pedantic a point since, as Offe himself demonstrates, 
there are practical constraints on state action which might threaten 
the process of capitalist accumulation (e.g. capital flight, 
investment strikes, etc.) However, it is still one aspect of Marxist 
analysis which requires refinement.
Certain aspects of Offe's analysis of decision-rules can also 
be criticized. In contending that power struggles are the basis on 
which policies within the allocative function are determined, Offe 
does not sufficiently elaborate on the nature and relative weight of 
power relationships within capitalist societies and one is left with 
the (presumably unintended) impression of some sort of pluralist 
interplay of competing equal demands (c.f. criticisms of the pluralists 
in Chapter 6.) Again, this is perhaps a pedantic point. More 
importantly howevey if the allocative function is itself necessary
for the maintenance of the conditions of capitalist accumulation
then the argument that it is wholly subordinate to the vagaries of 
political competition is debatable(c.f. criticisms of Saunders above) 
and it is unclear why the decision rules should be different in 
principle from those of the state’s productive function.
However, despite the criticisms which can be raised against
both Offe and other Marxist writers, the alternative theories proposed 
to generate useful insights into the nature of the state within the
capitalist system which cannot he dealt with by orthodox analysis.
The following section will consider some of these insights and attempt 
to demonstrate their importance for future analysis*
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The overriding value of Marxist theory lies in its attempt 
to locate the state as a whole within the capitalist mode of 
production. By rejecting a subjective approach to politics and by 
emphasizing the importance of the determination of social practices 
by economic, political and ideological structures, Marxist theory 
overcomes the limitations of orthodox analysis and provides a useful 
alternative paradigm for a more critical urban theory*
One of the initial and most important benefits of the Marxian 
approach is that it necessitates our reappraisal of what has been 
understood as the "urban” in advanced capitalist societies, both in 
theory and in practice. Thus, "urban” problems can no longer be 
viewed as merely spatially derived phenomina but must be seen as 
having their structural origins within the capitalist mode of 
production, and this has implications for the way we must view, for 
example, social service delivery, area-based initiatives in planning, 
deprivation and the problems of the inner city*
With regard to an understanding of the sphere of the political, 
Marxian analysis also raises important issues* The focus upon 
systemic determinants which ensure that state functions coincides with 
the "needs” of capitalist accumulation is both a valid and a valuable 
one. Although the exact nature of the relationship between the economic 
and the political as yet remains to be more fully developed and refined, 
such an approach does afford us a theoretical framework with which 
to analyze certain important questionss
(1) What are the limits of state action? Although Marxist 
analysis has not of yet provided us with a fully 
developed and coherent explanation of all aspects of the 
State’s positive actions, it does allow us to better 
understand the nature of the constraints and limitations 
on state action arising from this relationship*
One obvious aspect of these limitations is the fact that, 
state expenditure, being a deduction from surplus-value, is therefore 
limited by the competing claims of private capital on that surplus 
value, (which must be met if accumulation is to continue)*
The urban fiscal crisis which has affected many large cities 
demonstrates the STRUCTURAL limits, within the framework of 
dominant capitalist relations, of the increasing socialisation of
public services* It has been argued by Marxist writers (e.g* O’Connor, 
1973, Friedland et.al. 1977* Offe, 1975* and Castells, 1978) that, 
in advanced capitalism, the socialization of public services and otha? 
measures to subsidize and protect the accumulation process by the 
state has assumed increasing importance for the maintenance of both 
productivity and profitability of private capital. As a result, 
state expenditure has had to increase while at the same time the 
state has continued to permit the private appropriation of profits*
The state has also had to absorb the popular discontent generated by 
the social costs of the accumulation process and also finds that 
economic demands are becoming increasingly articulated within the 
political system* Demand from both sides have thus got to be met if the 
state is to attempt to reconcile its productive function with its
legitimation requirements, O’Connor (1973) argues that, 
financially, these dual functions of the state, and especially urban 
government, are entering into contradiction with one another - 
however, the question of whether these contradictions are manifest 
at all times within the capitalist state, or whether they arise only 
at certain junctives, is a question requiring further research.
The question raised by Offe regarding the ability of the 
capitalist state to modify its own structure and decision-making 
process in order to successfully face up to these demands has also 
been relatively unexplored by Marxists, Friedland et.al, suggest 
that the reason why the contradictory nature of the functions have 
not generated a crisis within the state but only infrequent 
convulsions is due to specific structural arrangements (developed 
especially at the local level) which mediate the potentially 
antagonistic functions and which allow urban governments to cope with 
both the requirements of economic growth and of political integration, 
even during periods of potentially intense conflict.
Thus, all western capitalist states provide for some degree 
of structural segregation between those governmental activities which 
further economic growth and those which facilitate the political 
integration of the urban population, and there is also a widespread 
tendency for these functions to be fragmented among different agencies 
and programmes. Again, however, this is an interesting hypothesis 
deserving of more concrete Marxist analysis. Are there trends which 
can be observed regarding the growth of semi-autonomous and non-elected 
governmental agencies which correlate with the ascribed need of the 
capitalist state to provide some degree of separation between its
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political-integrative functions and its economic functions? A 
similar application of this hypothesis could be directed towards the 
changes in the internal management structure of the state.
There are other issues, too extensive to be elaborated upon 
here, which are raised by Marxist analysis of the state and its 
relationship to the process of capitalist accumulation - issues 
which question the validity of orthodox analysis and which, even 
if historical materialist theory is ultimately proved to be of 
limited explanatory value as an alternative paradigm, nevertheless 
has at least forced us in to a critical assessment of the current 
orthodoxy. This in itself is proof of its importance#
However, Marxist analysis may have to critically examine
the question of whether all aspects of the state can be fully 
explained and analyzed in terms of a single, all-embracing theory, 
however much refined. In validly situating its object of analysis 
within the context of the wider social formation, Marxist analysis 
is perhaps too prone to overlook the distinction between explaining 
the functional role of the phenomenon and explaining its genesis, 
and the validity of subsuming both aspects within the one theory 
is often debatable. It could therefore be argued that orthodox 
analysis can be an analytically useful complement, and not an 
incompatible polar opposite, to the Marxist approach in this 
respect and should therefore not be dismissed a priori as being 
irrelevant.
22,000.
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